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ABSTRACT This thesis uses the available literature regarding Egypt's nuclear development
program from 1952 to 1981 to show that a weak state faces insurmountable structural restraints in
developing nuclear weapons even if motivation and capability are present. According to
international security conditions and initial science development in 1952, Egypt should have
acquired nuclear weapons by 1970. Presidents Nasir and Sadat undermined the very Egyptian
agencies they created to develop nuclear weapons technology. A state's international security
motives and technology development are necessary but not sufficient conditions for nuclear
proliferation. The necessary and sufficient condition is that the state be a strong state, able to
extract resources from society and able to enact policies which require societal compliance. Weak
state leaders cannot resolve the dilemma of opposing domestic security and international security
priorities without obstructing their designated state agencies from developing nuclear weapons.
United States nuclear nonproliferation policy must consider the political variable of state strength
in order to determine the likelihood of proliferation.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis uses the available literature regarding Egypt's nuclear
development program from 1952 to 1981 to show that a weak state faces
insurmountable structural restraints from developing nuclear weapons
even if motivation and capability are present . According to
international security conditions and initial science development in
1952, Egypt should have acquired nuclear weapons by 1970. Presidents
Nasir and Sadat undermined the very Egyptian agencies they created to
develop nuclear weapons technology. A state's international security
motives and technology development are necessary but not sufficient
conditions for nuclear proliferation. The necessary and sufficient
condition is that a state be a strong state, able to extract resources
from society and able to enact policies which require societal
compliance. Weak state leaders cannot resolve the dilemma of opposing
domestic security and international security priorities without
constraining their designated state agencies from developing nuclear
weapons. United States nuclear nonproliferation policy must consider
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
While Egypt had motivation and capability to go nuclear in the 1952-
1981 period, it failed to do so because of the structural weakness of
the state. Fearing the creation of a political "power center" within
the state elite, the regime undermined the very agencies it created to
obtain nuclear weapons. Conventional nuclear proliferation literature
does not explain why Egypt did not "go nuclear" . To all outward
appearances Egypt was strongly motivated and technically as capable as
other states (in 1955) which did eventually achieve nuclear weapons -
Israel, India and Pakistan. The historical case of Egypt's nuclear non-
proliferation under Presidents Nasir and Sadat can be largely explained
by the model of weak states. This is a departure from conventional
international relations theoretical explanations for what restrains or
obstructs a state from acquiring nuclear weapons
.
The three conventional models for explaining the processes of
nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation are the motivational
imperative, the technological imperative, and the idiosyncratic
occurrence. According to the motivational model, Egypt possessed the
motivational factors to produce a nuclear explosive device by 19 65 and
was prevented from doing so by scientific and financial shortfalls. The
motivational model establishes that Egypt met the necessary condition of
motive by 1961. But it does not explain why Nasir fired a strong
nuclear-weapon-proponent directing the Egyptian program, Colonel Salah
Hedayat, at the time when Egypt suspected Israel was only three years
away from producing a bomb, and afterwards attempted to buy the bomb
directly from the Soviet Union.
According to the technological model, the international and
vi
bilateral embargoes of weapons -production technology requests prevented
Egypt from acquiring the know-how to manufacture the facilities to
produce a nuclear weapon. According to the technological model, Egypt
possessed sufficient initial scientific interest in 1952 to have
achieved latent technical capacity to build a bomb by 1970. The
technological model explains that because Egypt never developed the
necessary scientific and technical expertise or the ability to
profitably extract available natural resources, the program faltered.
Egypt's case is often explained as never developing the technology
because of the investment capital deficit. This explanation is
insufficient. Donald MacKenzie's comparative -politics variant of the
technological model, that successful technological change is dependent
upon a proponent scientist's manipulation of existing economic
constraints and political constraints, might show that Egypt did develop
the scientific organization, but that organization was not able to
persuade the leadership of the feasibility of military applications.
MacKenzie's model cannot be proven with available information. The
technological model does not explain Egypt's advanced scientific base
despite technology embargoes. Egyptian scientists have succeeded in
directing other nuclear weapons programs such as the Iraqi one.
My use of the weak state model applied to nuclear weapons
proliferation proposes that structural political weakness is the
determining factor of a state's inability to develop nuclear weapons.
The existing regime fears the political mobilization of the nuclear
science community and its potential coalition with military cliques, or
other power centers, to overthrow the regime. The leader faces a
dilemma of choosing between changing domestic priorities and
international security priorities. The regime indirectly prevents the
maturation of a bomb program by fostering institutional instability,
VI
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coopting scientific directors, retiring politicall" unreliable weapons
proponents, and under -budgeting the program. Coir, ^rative politics
literature has established modern Egypt as a classic case of a weak
state governing a strong society. Other potential nuclear weapons
states which are structurally weak states are: Mexico, Syria and Saudi
Arabia. Modern Iran and North Korea are strong states. Egypt's
structural -political weakness has continued or worsened in the last
fifteen years, therefore weak- state politics will continue to obstruct a
weapons development program.
Weak state comparative politics theory provides an explanatory model
where existing nuclear non-proliferation motivational theory,
technological theory, and some idiosyncratic models, are inadequate to
explain given conditions . Nuclear weapons motives and nuclear weapons
technology remain necessary conditions for the years -long process of
developing states attempts to go nuclear, however the necessary and
sufficient condition is that the developing state be a structurally
strong state. That is, the state must be able to extract resources from
society and be able to enact regime policies so that society complies
with state rules. The ruling regime must consolidate its power enough
so it does not fear a "palace coup" . A strong state will not fear the
domestic political threat of an atomic science community allied with a
political party in opposition to the regime.
United States nuclear nonproliferation policies can positively
influence both a strong state's nuclear weapons motives and a weak
state's level of nuclear technology. American or international nuclear
restraints should be so directed. The domestic security threat of a
nuclear science organization must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
for each potential nuclear weapon state. Domestic politics is the
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I . INTRODUCTION
What explains the absence of nuclear proliferation where motive and
capability are clearly evident? Why would a state with significant
industrial and scientific bases, which has initiated a nuclear program
and which is engaged in a military and political struggle with an enemy
it knows is developing nuclear weapons, seek to undermine its own
nuclear program?
Drawing on the case of Egypt from 1952 to 1981, this thesis seeks to
explain nuclear nonproliferation by looking at the structure and
consolidation of state power. Weak states - those with extractive and
implemental structures unable to adequately perform their tasks - will
tend to have regimes not only unable to carry out the social
transformations they sought, but afraid of creating power centers within
state structures which could threaten the political survival of the
regime itself. Given the dilemma of pursuing significant policy choices
such as acquiring nuclear weapons, which can create centers of power
beyond the ability of a regime to control, and thereby risking
political survival, weak states will undermine the very agencies they
created to carry out such policy goals.
According to international security conditions and initial science
development in 1952, Egypt should have acquired nuclear weapons by 1970.
Egypt's leaders tried to develop nuclear weapons before Israel obtained
them. In 1953 Egypt initiated a strategic rocket development program.
The Egyptian Atomic Energy Establishment was formed in 1955. In 1961
Egypt possessed an operating research reactor. The regime invested
heavily in a cobalt -60 -warhead rocket program from 1960-1963. Egypt
attempted to buy nuclear weapons directly twice, first from the USSR in
1965 and then from the Peoples Republic of China in 1967.' Throughout
this • iriod Egyptian leaders suspected Israel of developing an atomic
bomb. The newspapers first confirmed Israel's capacity to make an
atomic weapon and to deliver it by long range ballistic missile in July
1970. 2 Why did Egypt not develop some limited nuclear weapons
capability during a continuous Egyptian- Israeli armed rivalry3 before
acceding to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1981?
The Egyptian- Israeli nuclear arms race occurred from 1955 to 1981.
Egyptian leaders knew of the enemy capacity, directed a project of their
own, fought wars against that enemy, and even developed chemical
weapons, but hampered the progress of its own nuclear weapons program
repeatedly throughout this period. Why? What explains the absence of
nuclear proliferation where motive and capability are clearly evident?
A. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION IN DEVELOPING STATES
Existing international relations models of nonproliferation do not
satisfactorily explain why Egypt did not develop a nuclear weapons
capability by 1981. I submit that the theory of weak states provides a
more consistent explanation of the contradictions apparent in the
Egyptian nuclear development program. 4 This study is the first use of
'Hedrick Smith, "Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense, " New York Times ,
4 February 1966, pp 1,12; Mohammed Heikal, The Cairo Documents , New York:
Doubleday & Company, 1973, pp 305, 313; Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the
Middle East , New York: Routledge, 1988 p 56.
2Hedrick Smith, "US Assumes the Israelis Have A-Bomb or Its Parts," New York
Times 18 July 1970, pp 1,8.
3This rivalry included four wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973) and periods of
state -supported violence less than war (fedayeen attacks from 1953-1956, and the
war of attrition from 1967-1970) .
''While the "state -strength" comparative politics literature is vast, I have
chosen to use Joel S. Migdal's, Strong Societies and Weak States , (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988) as primary reference. This work is the best
the previously established weak, state model to explain why a motivated
and capable state did not develop nuclear weapons. In this case, the
appearance of nuclear proliferation camouflaged a weak state leader'
s
control of potential threats from within the regime. That appearance of
developing nuclear weapons, whether intended or unintended, provided two
political benefits for the leader: (1) towards the state's external
allies and rivals, a credible threat of investment in weapons
technology, and (2) towards the scientific pro-nuclear community,
restraint of a potential challenge to mobilize opposition against the
regime. Egypt's failure to acquire nuclear weapons from 1955 to 1981 is
directly due to the political weakness of the authoritarian regime, not
technical constraints or changing motives.
Conventional explanations for why a state does not succeed in
developing nuclear weapons neglect domestic political issues which are
especially important in developing states. The interactive relationship
between domestic politics and international security hampers developing
states' external security. A developing state can experience points in
time when domestic priorities and international priorities are
synchronized to support a nuclear weapons program. Sometimes these
priorities conflict with "going nuclear." At times the boundaries
between foreign and domestic security become blurred. Most nuclear non-
proliferation literature focuses on changing motives to acquire nuclear
weapons and restraining nuclear scientific capabilities. The dissuasive
motivational explanations or the scientific technology hurdles only
partially explain why Egypt did not complete the development of an
atomic bomb. International security motivations and scientific
capabilities are necessary but not sufficient conditions for nuclear
accounting of the political dynamic I use to explain states' attempts, or lack
thereof, to acquire nuclear weapons.
proliferation. The third condition which is both necessary and
sufficient is that a state must be a strong state, politically able to
extract resources, enforce regulatory compliance and execute political
policy decisions, in order to go nuclear.
I examine the reports available in open literature, regarding
Egypt's nuclear development program, from 1952 to 1981. During the
period when the Egyptian leadership was publicly committed to matching
Israel's suspected nuclear capability, the leadership intermittently
undermined the indigenous development program. Rather than making a
consistent long-range investment in nuclear technology, President Gamal
Abd al-Nasir attempted to buy the technology covertly in 1965 and again,
after losing a war, in 1967. It was this political weakness and not
international nuclear nonproliferation pressure, nor technological
backwardness, which restrained a capable and motivated state from
developing nuclear weapons. Egyptian scientific and technological
capabilities initially encouraged the leadership's decision to obtain
nuclear arms. Later, after significant progress, the leader of the
Atomic Energy Establishment threatened to ally with potential rivals to
the regime within the state party (the Arab Socialist Union) and the
army. The leadership initially tried to acquire nuclear weapons, but
later favored other, less politically-threatening, conventional and
chemical weapons. The Egyptian government's commitment to nuclear
weapons acquisition during this period of armed rivalry with Israel
waxed and waned with the confidence of the authoritarian leader in his
support. From 1956 to 1964 and again from 1973 to 1975, the leader was
confident in his support from regime elites. If tfr - government had
consistently supported the scientists after 1956, tne state probably
could have developed nuclear weapon technology before 1981 as Israel
did. The theory of weak states explains the government agency
appointments, "retirement" of politically dangerous proponents to
innocuous posts in the government, budget allocations, and frequent
reorganizations and fragmentation of the Egyptian nuclear science
community.
B. WEAK- STATE HYPOTHESIS
Only strong states can go nuclear. Given the necessary conditions
of security motive and basic scientific capability, the necessary and
sufficient condition for a state to develop its own nuclear weapons is
that it be a strong state. A strong state is defined by its ability to
extract resources from and execute policy decisions over its society. A
security-motivated and scientifically- capable weak state faces the
domestic political dilemma of either: (1) fully supporting the
scientific community's development of nuclear weapons, with the expected
gains in international power, but risking that the scientific community
may ally with a coalition to overthrow the regime 5
,
or (2) actively
opposing the scientific community's development of nuclear weapons,
thereby losing prestige within the regime elites and risking the same
anti- regime coalition. A weak state will bounce back and forth between
these two courses unintentionally as a by product of attempts to remain
in power. International security and domestic security priorities may
periodically support a nuclear weapons program, but they are more often
contradictory, one supporting and the other opposing a nuclear weapons
program. By political learning, the leader arrives at the safest course
of action - allowing the scientific community to proceed with the
nuclear development project and interfering with that same project when
it threatens to mobilize opposition to the regime, or when it just gets
more power than it should have.
5Either the scientific community itself may become politically active or the
political representative overseeing the scientific community.
If the weak state leader can insulate the atomic energy development
community from such political competition and bureaucratic budgetary-
rivalry, he may support the project consistently, but at considerable
risk of a domestic coup. As long as the military is assured of its
position within the regime, it will support the development of nuclear
weapons. The military leadership will oppose going nuclear if that
means loss of military influence over the regime and gain of influence
over the regime by an extra-military domestic coalition. The scientific
community becomes a potential coalition party while it is developing an
advanced technology with both civilian and military applications. The
weak state must coopt or disrupt the scientific community in order to
preempt political threats to the regime.
C. ORDER OF THE STUDY
This case study is limited to the period from 1952 to 1981 for five
reasons. First, this is the period of heightened international rivalry
when Egypt's motives to acquire nuclear weapons are strongest. Second,
this period includes times of varying nuclear technology export
controls, from the relatively open access of the 1954 Atoms for Peace
period to the restrictions of the London (Nuclear) Suppliers Group
export controls in the middle 1970' s. Third, Egypt joined the
international nonproliferation regime by ratifying the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty in February 19 81, seemingly quitting the nuclear
arms race with Israel. After that time, Egypt's motives for acquiring
nuclear weapons significantly decreased. Fourth, this period typifies
the stage that a newly formed, post-colonial "underdeveloped" state
experiences during attempts at industrial modernization. This stage
will be repeated many times over as so-called "third-world states"
modernize. Fifth, the political relationship of state and society
during these two regimes, including the transition between them, were
characterized by narrow constituencies and varying degrees of popular
support and political participation. Nasir rode a decreasing wave of
popular support and Sadat constantly battled for popular support. The
acquired popular support was ephemeral for both Nasir and Sadat.
The military character of the regime during this period implies that
this model applies to any other military- supported regimes. That is not
the cased. Some military- supported regimes are strong states, as were
North Korea and the Soviet Union during their atomic development
programs. Military regimes formed during wars of liberation or as a
result of war exhibit characteristics of strong states. However many
military- supported regimes in developing countries are examples of weak,
states. Turkey and Syria are examples of this.
The order of the study follows. The first chapter gives a general
review of existing nonproliferation literature and then introduces the
weak states model for studying nuclear proliferation. The second
chapter examines Egypt's nuclear development program from 1952 to 1981.
The third chapter analyzes the Egyptian case in terms of the weak state
model . Here I compare my original explanation with the traditional
explanations for why Egypt did not acquire nuclear weapons. The fourth
chapter suggests implications and generalizations from this case
history, which may apply to other aspiring nuclear weapons states.
Additionally this section suggests implications of the weak state model
on U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy.
II. EXISTING LITERATURE REVIEW
Three general themes are usually found in efforts to explain the
path toward nuclear proliferation: the motivational imperative
(intentions determine the result) , the technological imperative
(capabilities determine the result) and the idiosyncratic occurrence (a
unique sequence of events not dominated by capabilities or intentions) .'
The following summaries are representative of the existing literature on
nuclear proliferation. They are given here to provide a context for the
political model of weak states with strong societies.
A. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MODELS
1. Motivational Imperative
Stephen Meyer's quantitative analysis of capabilities and
intentions supports the motivational imperative : state leadership
intentions are the key component in explaining the years -long process of
acquiring nuclear weapons. Technical limitations can slow the
proliferation process but state motivations are the key to all decisions
whether or not to "go nuclear" . Meyer demonstrates no clear
correlation between technology and nuclear proliferation. His argument
supports technology as a necessary but not sufficient condition for
nuclear proliferation. The key explanatory variable is the motivational
profile of the state, which historically has differed from state to
state. 2
According to Meyer, three basic categories of incentives
motivate or dissuade a state leadership towards a nuclear weapons
'Meyer, op. cit., pp 9-18
2Ibid.
, pp 165-166.
program: domestic politics, military security, and international power
or prestige. 3 The range of possible motivations and dissuasive
conditions affecting the decision to acquire nuclear technology and to
make nuclear bombs is listed below. 4
These motives and dissuasive factors affect decisions to cancel
funding for the program, continue domestic latent technology
development, test a peaceful explosion, or to produce weapons. Egypt's
motives and dissuasive factors are selected from this list in th
econcluding section. To state the obvious, determining whether a motive
of dissuasive condition existed at all at a point in history is a
subjective judgement. Then determining the relative strength of the
motives and disincentives is purely arbitrary. The evaluation process
is given to normative bias. The difficulty in comparing motives does
not negate their presence. Motivation must be included, albeit vaguely




, pp 44-74. These motives are: (1) security threat from nuclear-
armed adversary, (2) adversary with latent nuclear arms capacity, (3)
overwhelming conventional military threat, (4) regional power status or
pretensions, (5) uncertain state existence (pariah state) , (6) quest for military
superiority, (7) deterring regional intervention by a superpower, (8) global
power status or pretensions (9) domestic turmoil opposing the regime (10)
industrial spinoffs, (11) low military institutional morale (12) neighboring
states' possession of nuclear weapons (13) intolerably high economic defense
burden, (14) loss in alliance credibility with a nuclear ally, (15) general
global trend toward acquiring nuclear weapons, (16) global increase in nuclear
weapons inventory. Dissuasive factors are: (1) nuclear ally's security
guarantee, (2) preemptive intervention by global powers, (3) international legal
commitments, (4) peaceful reputation, (5) rival with latent capacity (fear of
nuclear arms race) (6) risk of unauthorized seizure, (7) domestic politics.
Craig and Jungerman (Nuclear Arms Race: Technology and Society , New York:
McGrawHill, 1990, p 438) include the following dissuasive factors: (8) strategic
credibility gap (non-utility of nuclear weapons)
, (9) absence of foreign threat,
(10) political -economic sanctions, (11) public opinion, and (12) domestic
bureaucratic competition.
2. Other International -Relations Based Sources
Mitchell Reiss defines nuclear proliferation as a function of
technological capability and political motivation. 5 He analyzes the
effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime in obstructing six
technologically capable states from producing nuclear weapons (Sweden,
South Korea, Japan, and India) or publicly acknowledging their nuclear
weapons status (Israel and South Africa) . This study emphasizes the
motivational perspective and concludes that four "sources of restraint"
provided just enough friction to prevent the state from either producing
the weapons or publicly admitting that fact. Those restraints are (1)
domestic political opposition, (2) bilateral foreign policy pressures,
(3) international non-proliferation measures, and (4) a general
international consensus against nuclear weapons . The author admits to
the weakness of proving these last two restraints in the case histories
surveyed. He recommends a non-proliferation policy which strengthens
each of these restraints
.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute prepared a
motivational -based analysis of nuclear non-proliferation in preparation
for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. 6 The purpose of this book was to
show the motives and dissuasive factors in each of fifteen state's
acquisition of nuclear technology and their decisions whether or not to
join the NPT. This study is dated by its choice of Israel in the case
studies. The editor concludes that a concert of international measures
can successfully block proliferation if they are tailored to each
state's proliferation motivations.
Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear
Nonproliferation , New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, pp 248-269.
6Jozef Goldblat, editor, Non-proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore ,
London: Taylor and Francis, 1985.
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Shyam Bhatia argues that intentions will overcome technological
limitations in future cases of nuclear proliferation in the middle
east. 7 This source is one of the more detailed case studies available
in the public domain. He reviews the proliferation histories of six
states: Israel, Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. He concludes
that both Israel's early commitment to nuclear weapons and western
encouragement of commercial applications created strong motivations for
proliferation in the middle east. The author implies that the reason
that Israel and Pakistan succeeded in developing the capability to
produce nuclear weapons was a combination of unofficial access to
foreign technology and long-range commitment in the early decisions
during research and development. Both governments consistently
supported the program despite international opposition. The author
concludes that international non-proliferation measures have delayed the
further spread to date (1988) but the motivational imperative will one
day overcome the technological limitation in one or more of Israel's
regional rivals.
The Brookings Institution provides a description of US non-
proliferation policy within the general foreign policy context. 8 This
compilation does not lean heavily in favor of any one of the
technological, motivational, or idiosyncratic explanations, but
addresses both intentions and capabilities. The contributing authors
describe the context of the nonproliferation debate in nine states and
in the Arab- Israeli conflict. The editor concludes with an equal
emphasis on the importance of both (1) reversing each state's unique
motivations and (2) blocking international technology transfers to limit
7Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East
. London: Routledge, 1988;
pp 108-112.
8Joseph A. Yager, editor, Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy ,
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980, pp 407-425.
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state capabilities. This study is a more general review of the state
foreign policy issues of nonproliferation.
B. COMPARATIVE POLITICS MODELS
Donald MacKenzie presents an alternative political explanation for
the development of increased missile guidance accuracy, which could be
applied to explanations for the process of nuclear proliferation:
successful technological change is dependent upon successful
manipulation of existing economic constraints and political
constraints. 9 MacKenzie refutes the supposition that states naturally
seek advanced weapons technology with a case study of US development of
nuclear missile guidance accuracy. Technological advancements must be
considered within their organizational, political, and economic context.
Successful technology advances require the following conditions:
first, developing an organizational base capable of pursuing the new
technology, and second, persuading the political leadership of the
feasibility of the practical applications. Mackenzie includes the roles
of domestic frictions such as bureaucratic infighting and bureaucratic
predisposition as well as state motivations to obtain the technology
applications. Applying this potentially powerful argument to explain a
case of potential nuclear proliferation requires unique access to a
developing state's scientists and politicians. This model applied to
Egypt's case of nuclear science development might show how Egypt did
develop a scientific organization base but was not able to persuade the
political leadership of the feasibility of military applications. The
weak-state model compliments MacKenzie' s political explanation of
successful technological change.
TJonald A. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nucleai
Missile Guidance , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990, pp 382-423.
12
Peter Lavoy provides another political explanation for non-
proliferation. He argues that an individual scientist or technical
expert can sway the political decision either for or against
proliferation by their unique technical and political qualifications. 10
This explanation is dependent upon the existence of such experts in the
suspected state. The influence of the expert is limited by the
decision-making pattern of the government, societal political culture,
the relative strength of debate for and against proliferation at the
policy-making level, and other case-unique factors.
James Katz and Onkar Marwah emphasize that nuclear proliferation is
determined by scientific advancement with a political twist. Their
review of developing countries nuclear programs presents the interaction
of the scientific community with the political leadership. Scientists'
influence is dependent upon the interaction of resource constraints,
intellectual techniques and social (political) processes in each
state." Their case studies highlight the technological capability
shortfalls in underdeveloped countries.
Scilla McClean analyzes nuclear weapons decision-making by the big
five nuclear powers between 1982 and 1986. He concludes with
similarities between the decision-making process of developing and
expanding a nuclear weapons arsenal. 12 These political observations may
be characteristic of a developing country's initial attempts at
proliferation as well. They are: (1) political decisions made long
before weapons applications are feasible were critical to future
10Peter Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation, "
Security Studies , Volume 2 Numbers 3/4, Spring/Summer 1993, pp 192-212.
"James E. Katz, Onkar S. Marwah, editors, Nuclear Power in the Developing
Countries , New York: Free Press, 1982.
12Scilla McClean, editor How Nuclear Weapons Decisions Are Made , New York:
St Martin's Press, 1986, pp 254-258.
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development, (2) state bureaucratic rivalry produced conflicting advice
to the decision maker, (3) weak financial controls allowed political
decision makers to hide relatively large unbudgeted expenditures, (4)
secrecy obstructed potential contributions from scientists without
access to the program, (5) secrecy excluded broader strategic policy
options from consideration by key decision-makers, and (6) the atomic
science bureaucracy competed with its superior government office, and
evaded technical challenges from above. Given access to the founders of
the Egyptian atomic science program, these observations could be proven
to explain Egypt's not developing nuclear weapons.
C. WEAK- STATE MODEL OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
The tendency in the international relations literature is either to
generalize the process of nuclear nonproliferation into models which
lose explanatory strength when applied universally, or to treat each
occurrence as idiosyncratic using a detailed case study. Each of the
above authors provide partial explanations for individual cases of
nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation. The political arguments of
MacKenzie, Lavoy, and McClean are the point of departure for the weak
state model of analyzing Egypt's nuclear nonproliferation.
The weak- state model for explaining why motivated and capable states
do not acquire nuclear weapons is conditioned upon an adequate minimum
industrial base and political -military motivations to do so. This model
is not to be confused with the "domestic politics" element from the
motivational hypothesis. In general terms, my argument posits that
nonproliferation is a direct function of structural state regime
weakness, not of particular domestic political agendas.
The state is the aggregation of institutions responsible for two
broad functions: (1) extracting resources from society for the
execution of policy, and (2) enforcing pronounced rules upon the
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society, using force if necessary. The state is characterized by a its
capability to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract
resources and appropriate the resources for specific purposes 13 . A
strong state has consolidated power so that it may extract resources and
enact policies. State strength is not measured by the degree of
societal autonomy or by percentage of available resources extracted, but
in the manner of compliance with state regulations and in how
successfully the resources are employed to achieve specific
objectives 14 .
Historically, states gained the political strength to extract
resources and enforce rules upon society within the context of violence,
by war or violent revolution. Human violence, inflicted by armies or in
the name of social justice, polarizes social groups into political
constituencies. States which were formed absent this experience with
war or violent political revolution usually demonstrate weak capability
to extract resources and enforce rules upon their supposed constituency.
As Barrington Moore has argued, immense political violence has always
been the necessary condition for meaningful social change. 15 In the
developing world, war or revolution created strong states whereas
nontraumatic, peaceful "decolonization" resulted in weak states.
A strong state is typified by tangible results from application of
extracted resources (people, capital, equipment), as well as day-to-day
routine normative compliance with state regulations. In this case,
application of extracted resources is the state's program to develop an





, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord
and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World
. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, pp
505-506.
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advanced technology (nuclear science) for civilian and military-
applications .
A new technology with little chance of short-term return on
investment requires initial research an development funding either by
large corporations in the western industrialized states or by the
government in the less developed modernizing states. Third-world states
do not have the industrial capital in private hands for this type of
advanced project. The state announces the nuclear development program,
establishes organizations to administer it, allocates program budgets,
appoints key administrators, and establishes criteria for recruiting
personnel to work in the program. The degree of success of the program
is ximited by individual initiative, technical feasibility, and support
from the state by application of extracted resources.
A strong society is one which has developed a _ivil code of rules
autonomous from external influence. If these rules are not those
adopted by the state, the strong society will not comply with state
regulations. The strength of society is measured in terms of
independence from social control by the regime . Revolutionaries can
promise great reforms but they still need people to implement their
policies - the more these reforms are different from established social
patterns, the more coercive force is required to enforce them or else
the state must yield to the preceding social hierarchy.
The tool of social control is the state bureaucracy, which includes
the internal security forces and the army. In order for a new leader to
maintain control of a strong society, the tools of social control must
be made more powerful than rewards and sanctions imposed by preexisting
power elites.
A strong state can encourage private and state -funded organizations
as well as international scientific alliances to work independently from
16
government controls, within state secrecy regulations. A strong state
does not fear the mobilization of political opposition from the
organizations which may develop a nuclear weapon.
A weak state, by the above definition, may manipulate administrative
appointments to insure that the directors of such a program are loyal to
the regime. If a weak state leader disrupts the nuclear development
organization completely and disbands it, he runs the risk of the
scientists and administrators forming an opposition party outside of the
country and continuing their program with funding from rival states or
rival political groups within the state concerned. It may be more
effective for a weak state leader to coopt the potential leaders of such
a nuclear development program into positions of apparent power, under
the control of the state. Thus the potential nuclear weapons scientists
may be given just enough of a state budget to keep them busy, or may be
appointed to figurehead positions of dignity, with no potential to
mobilize political opposition to the regime. A weak state cannot just
fire a leader- scientist who appears disloyal - it must politically
neutralize him from further involvement with that political interest
group. Another tactic of a weak state may be to create organizations
which will compete with each other for the same limited extracted
resources - human capital (administrators, scientists, engineers,
technicians) investment capital, and plant and equipment. Yet another
tactic may be to create new administrative organizations to oversee the
scientists' research and development. Banishment from the state is
reserved for those individuals who will not be coopted to work in a less
threatening capacity or those who cannot mobilize opposition to the
regime from overseas (who have no expatriate constituency.)
Strong societies under weak states may show the following
characteristics in a state strongly predisposed to nuclear
17
proliferation. First, the scientific community may oppose the regime on
political grounds. Alternately, the scientific community may form a
coalition with other professional syndicates or politically mobilized
groups, opposed to specific regime policies such as social justice for
the lower classes, educational reform, or increasing military buildup.
The extraction of natural resources, human capital, and investment
capital can be delayed by the scientists' social networks. Thirdly,
the scientific community rnay oppose the objective secretly, on moral or
political grounds.
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III. EGYPTIAN CASE STUDY: 19 52-19 81
Egypt's history of nuclear development is filled with contradictions
which the weak state model explains better than any existing literature.
Both Nasir and Sadat vacillated between empowering the atomic science
program with consistent support and blatantly obstructing the program.
In the process, Egyptian scientists developed the highest degree of
technological experience possible, limited by changing levels of state
support. The case study is ordered chronologically to contrast the
regime's early commitment to going nuclear with its later interference
in the project. In the long-run, from 1952 to 1981, domestic political
security issues dominated international security issues. This is due to
the nature of the state. Modern Egypt is a weak state attempting to
govern a strong society.
A. INITIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATENT NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CAPACITY
1. Egyptian Science Background
Egyptian industrialists created the initial demand for
technological modernization even before the Free Officer revolution on
23 July 1952, according to Adel A. Sabet . ' In 1939 the government
established the Fouad I National Research Council to coordinate research
for uses in agriculture, industry, public health, defense, and the
national economy. The council remained inactive until 1947, when it
drafted plans for a National Laboratory for Chemical and Industrial
Research including a future national physics laboratory and an
'Adel A. Sabet represented the official Egyptian government position as a
member of the General Department of Scientific Relations, Council of Scientific
Research, at the Science and Technology in Developing Countries Conference held
in Beirut from 27 November to 2 December 1967.
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agricultural research station. The National Research Council merged
with the Permanent Council for National Production in November 1953 to
form the National Research Institute. 2 At the time of the 19 cn
revolution, Egyptian scientists possessed a small scientific ^_.dre for
industrial expansion. Whether or not the scientists were capable of
administratively supervising a rapid industrial modernization program
using advanced technologies is a separate question.
Shyam Bhatia supports Sabet's theme of a scientific community in
search of government sponsorship. Of the 1400 Egyptian science
graduates in 1952 (including undergraduate and graduate degrees) , the
majority specialized in medicine. At this time, some of these medical
scientists sought radioactive isotope applications for use in hospitals.
Additionally, Cairo University physicists wanted a Vandergraaf
accelerator for particle physics basic research. Before 1955, the
regime did not support these requests. 3 Cairo University began an
undergraduate nuclear physics program in 1953. 4 This pool of scientists
represents a significant potential for developing advanced technologies,
provided they receive consistent financial and political support for
basic research until industrial applications could be derived.
According to El-Sayed Selim, Egypt's early interest in nuclear
technology was a response to external factors rather than internal
economic or political demand. President Eisenhower's Atoms For Peace
program was announced in December 1953 . Under the terms of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission began negotiations
2Adel A. Sabet, "UAR Commitments to Science and Technology, " from Claire
Nader and A. B. Zahlan, eds
.
, Science and Technology in Developing Countries ,
London: Cambridge University Press, 19 69, pp 187-188.
3Bhatia, op. cit., p 49.
4Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, "Egypt," from James E. Katz, Onkar S. Marwah,
eds., Nuclear Power in Developing Countries . New York: Free Press, 1982, p 137.
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in 1954 with Egyptian officials, resulting in installation of a
radioisotope laboratory in the Egyptian National Research Center in June
1956 and training for Egyptian scientists. 5 This initial cooperation
led to the training of 105 Egyptian scientists in the United States from
1955 to 1976. 6 Sometime in 1955 the U.S. offered nuclear technology for
desalination and land reclamation through the Atoms for Peace program
but Nasir refused it. 7 American assistance in Egypt's modernization was
perceived at this time as a potential threat to Egyptian independence.
The opposition to British colonialism had been the single theme of all
political factions during the last twenty years of the Farouk regime,
and Nasir' s power was not yet consolidated to the point where he could
invite another western government to invest in a large industrial
venture
.
2. External Security Conditions
By 1955 both international political conditions and domestic
scientific demands converged. The 1950 Tripartite Declaration by the
US, Britain, and France had banned arms sales to Israel and the Arab
combatant states. Nasir discovered evidence in January 1955 that the
British and French were violating that supplier embargo. Turkey had
signed a Western- sponsored security assistance agreement with Pakistan
the previous April and another with Iraq in February 1955. Nasir'
s
regime strongly opposed Western imperialism in the region in any form,
economic, military, or political. The Free Officers employed the anti-
imperialistic public consensus to mold a supporting coalition from 1952-
5Ibid.
, p 135.
'Henry S. Rowan and Richard Brodie, "The Middle East, " from Joseph A. Yager,
ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy . Washington D. C. : Brookings
Institution, 1980, p 216.
7John K. Cooley, "Egypt Assessing Nuclear Strength, " Christian Science
Monitor , 2 January 1975, pp 1, 4.
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1954, until they had eliminated all political rivals. Israel's
announcement of a commercial nuclear cooperation agreement with France
in 1954, may have increased Nasir's awareness of a potential nuclear
technology race. 8 If not, Nasir's conversation with Indian leader
Jawaharlal Nehru on 16 February 1955 must have impressed upon him the
need to develop the new technology. Nehru said of atomic power: "It
means strength in war and strength in peace, either through victory or
through productivity." 9 According to Heikal, Nasir respected Nehru for
his rational intellect. This recommendation could not have come at a
more ironic moment in time, two weeks before the Israeli attack in Gaza.
The trigger event, if one exists, was an Israeli raid on the
Egyptian army headquarters in Gaza on 28 February 1955. This
disproportionately heavy attack in response to an intermittent stream of
fedayeen small scale raids resulted in 38 Egyptians killed and 31
wounded. 10 Prior to this point Nasir had entered secret settlement
negotiations with Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharrett. These
international pressures caused Nasir to shift to a more confrontational
foreign policy.
According to Anthony Nutting, Nasir made four decisions
following the Israeli raid in Gaza: (1) to buy adequate conventional
arms to deter further Israeli attack, (2) to strengthen Arab League
security with a series of bilateral treaties, (3) to materially support
the Palestinian fedayeen attacks on Israel, and (4) to launch a
propaganda war against the pro -western Iraqi government and against
8Bhatia, op. cit., p 38.
'Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, The Cairo Documents . Garden City, New York
Doubleday and Company, 1973, pp 279-2 80.
'"Robert H. Stephens, Nasser, A Political Biography . New York: Simon ani
Shuster, 1971, pp 145-158.
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Israel." In the context of this security decision, Nasir must have
entertained suggestions to expand Egypt's nuclear infrastructure with a
view to future military applications. Israel was already known to have
begun its own civilian research program. As the most populous Arab
state in the region, bordering on Israel, Nasir was pressured to compete
with Israel's own science program in order to save Arab honor. In
question is Nasir' s own commitment to nuclear weapons. Professor
Ibrahim Hilmy Abdel Rahman, a London- trained astronomical physicist who
was Nasir' s cabinet ministerial secretary after 1954 was strategically
placed to advise Nasir to go nuclear. 12 At the time of these decisions,
Rahman must have entered the consultative process as a technical expert,
explaining the prospects for weapons applications of nuclear technology
in a developing nation.
3. Early Scientific Drive
In March 1955 a committee of scientists and Free Officers met to
discuss how to advance Egyptian nuclear research. As a result of this
meeting, a Board of Atomic Energy was created to promote the peaceful
uses of atomic energy and to train scientists in the related scientific
fields of medicine and agriculture. The Atomic Energy Establishment,
formed in October 1955, was divided into eight departments: mathematics
and theoretical physics, experimental nuclear physics, nuclear
chemistry, geology and raw materials, radio isotopes, radiation
protection and civil defense, and engineering and scientific equipment
and reactors . ' 3
"Anthony Nutting, Nasser . New York: E. P. Dutton, 1972; p 97.
12Clement Henry Moore, Images of Development: Egyptian Engineers in Search
of Industry . Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1980, p 88.
13Bhatia, op. cit., 50.
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Egyptian scientists attended the first conference on the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1955, primarily as observers. The
conference was chaired by Indian scientist Homi Bhabha, the architect
of India's military and civil nuclear program. The Egyptian delegation
included Professor Abdel Rahman, Dr. Ahmed Riad Turki (Cairo University
Professor of Chemistry) , Dr Mustafa Nazif (Dean of Engineering
Department at Cairo University) , and Professor El Halawani (Under-
Secretary to Ministry of Family Planning) . Two Egyptian graduate
students from Curie Laboratory also attended: Ismail Hazza, studying
cosmic ray physics, and Abdel Maaboud El Guibaily, studying nuclear
chemistry. The delegation attended to gather information, not to report
on Egyptian research. One scientific paper was presented on the subject
of uranyl strychnine flouride, based upon a previous student's doctoral
dissertation. 14 Such active participation in this conference signifies
Egyptian interest in the state of nuclear scientific research conducted
abroad at a time when the Egyptian universities were constrained by very
limited laboratory research facilities. Perhaps a purpose of attending
the conference was to establish professional contacts with leading
scientists overseas.
Colonel Kamal el -Din Husayn, a member of the first Revolutionary
Command Council, was appointed chairman of the Board of Atomic Energy
and the Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE) .
'
5 Professor Abdel Rahman was
appointed secretary- general . Rahman's technical qualifications and his
political connection to Nasir gave him wide latitude in the first five
years of the Egyptian atomic energy program. Rahman was appointed
director of the National Science Council in January 1956 was made
I4Bhatia, op. cit., pp 49-50.
15Richard H. Dekmejian, Patterns of Political Leadership . Albany, New York
State University of New York Press, 1975, pp 176-179.
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responsible for national planning. Under his direction, the first long-
range science plan was drafted in 1958. It emphasized basic research
initially, with industrial applications to follow. 16 The AEE initially-
invested in basic research and overseas training. Rahman negotiated the
first nuclear coordination agreement with the Soviet Union in 1957.
Under the terms of the protocol, the Soviets agreed to train Egyptian
nuclear scientists, supply a 2 -megawatt research reactor, and provide a
Vandergraf 2.5 megawatt particle accelerator for the AEE's theoretical
physics laboratory. 17
During the period 1956-1960, Nasir did not yet fully invest in
this new technology. After the political success of the Suez
nationalization and surviving military defeat in war, Nasir no longer
felt the need to consult with his Free Officer peers, in making state
policies. 18 He perceived that he did not need this weapon in order to
defeat Israel. Moreover, this type of technology could not be obtained
without foreign assistance and that assistance came with unacceptable
political conditions. During this early period of his regime he was
still obsessed with losing control of Egypt's newly-won independence to
foreign creditors just as Khedive Ismail had lost control to the
Europeans in the previous century. 19 Nasir' s rejection of US arms in
1954, US nuclear desalination and land reclamation offers in 1955, and
World Bank -Anglo -American financing for the Aswan High Dam in early 1956
may be partly explained by this fear of foreign economic control. This
same concern for economic and political neutrality limited Egyptian
16Moore, op. cit., p 88.
17Bhatia, op. cit., p 51
18Raymond Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat , Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 1988, p ???.
"Stephens, op. cit., pp 158, 170-173.
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nuclear development programs at a time when both the US and the Soviets
were increasing access to "peaceful" uses of nuclear technology.
Meanwhile the efforts of the nuclear scientists proceeded apace.
The Center for Nuclear Research was opened at Inchas in 1957. ^ In
March 1957 the state newspaper Al-Ahram reported the formation of the
Board of Atomic Energy into a new state corporation under Nasir's
personal chairmanship. 21 Rahman continued on as AEE Director-General.
Kamal al-Din Husayn was not relieved of his chairmanship of the Board of
Atomic Energy. Nasir left Husayn nominally in that position. This
reorganization reflects either: (1) that Nasir did not trust this
Revolutionary Command Council Free Officer with this degree of power, or
(2) that this program had become Nasir's personal pet project, or (3)
that Nasir trusted Rahman to work independently of a political
commissar, directing the technical aspect and to report back directly to
the President. What is not clear is how far in the future Nasir
expected military applications to become feasible.
Two of the six principles of the 1952 Revolution had been to
eliminate foreign imperialism and to rebuild a powerful army. Nuclear
weapons capacity would support Egyptian independence from western
imperialism and complement the technologically inferior Egyptian
military. Rahman was the technical point man for this decision,
assuaging his fellow scientists that the Board of Atomic Energy
symbolized Egyptian modernization.
Rahman negotiated the first nuclear cooperation agreement with
the USSR in 1957. The protocol included Soviet supply of a small 2-
megawatt research reactor at Inchas, a Vandergraaf 2.5 megawatt
^Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence . New York: Columbia Universit;
Press, 1982, p 71.
2IE1-Sayed Selim, op. cit., p 137.
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accelerator and training at undergraduate and graduate level in the
USSR. 22 Rahman directed Nasir' s long-range scientific and economic
planning, and forecast dual civilian and military applications probably
no earlier than the latter half of the 1960's. Initially, Nasir
probably accepted the length of time before practical applications would
be feasible. Indian Prime Minister Nehru's appeal to the US and the
USSR in November 1957 for peaceful uses of atomic power was forwarded to
Nasir with a personal note likely strengthening the peaceful uses
plea. 23 Nasir may have supported this position then.
Rahman's objective was to obtain foreign assistance for basic
research, to develop civilian applications, and to train scientists, at
a time when Nasir was attempting a non-aligned position balancing
Western and Soviet assistance to Egypt. The leader of the atomic
scientist community had a different set of priorities for modernizing,
than the President. Egypt's principal trading partners from 1959 to
August 1961 were, for export, the USSR and Czechoslovakia and for
import, the United States, USSR and West Germany. 24 Beginning in 1955,
the Soviet nuclear export policy was relatively unrestricted towards
supposed allies. Moscow had technology export agreements with China and
six eastern European states, including a 150 -megawatt , heavy water-
cooled reactor to Czechoslovakia. After Mao Tse-Tung attempted to use
the Sino-Soviet alliance to wrestle the island of Quemoy from Taiwan in
the summer of 1958, the Soviets began to implement a policy of nuclear
^Bhatia, op. cit., p 51.
^Heikal, 1973, op. cit., pp 288-289.
^"Egypt (UAR) , Sudan and Libya, Annual Supplement" Economist Intelligence
Unit (hereafter abbreviated EIU) London, April 1962, p 11.
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export restraint, curtailing or re -negotiating previous agreements. 25
This Soviet nuclear export restraint may have slowed the delivery of the
research reactor and Egypt's remaining requests for technical assistance
through 1975. Western technology assistance held more potential than
Soviet help until Nasir squandered his remaining international political
capital in 1965.
In 1959 Egypt requested help from the German government for a
national space program. This request was officially rejected but ten
German scientists were secretly recruited into a liquid- fueled surface-
to-surface rocket development program. 26 A separate project by the
German firm Hoechst Farben Werke for a heavy water production plant was
begun in 1959. Between 1956 and 1960 Egyptian surveys estimated
recoverable reserves of 28,000 tons of uranium oxide and 370,000 tons of
thorium oxide from heavy mineral sands and phosphate rock inside
Egypt. 27 In December 1959 the official press reported discovery of
uranium ore deposits near Rosietta and Demietta. 28 A Norwegian
cooperation agreement was signed in December 1959 for construction of a
radioisotope center. Professor El Guibaily, who had received his
Nuclear Chemistry PhD from Curie Laboratory in Paris, received one year
of postgraduate training in Norway's Nuclear Institute and returned to
Egypt in 1959 to run the AEE department of chemistry. 29 In 1959 Dr.
^Gloria Duffy, "Soviet Nuclear Exports," International Security , Volume 3,
Number 1, Summer 1978, pp 85-86; see also, Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Nuclear
Proliferation and Soviet Arms Control Policy," ORBIS, Volume XIV, Number 2,
Summer 1970, pp 308-311.
^Lewis A. Frank, "Nasser's Missile Program," ORBIS Quarterly Journal of
World Affairs . Volume XI, Number 3, Fall 19 67, p 749.
^Taysir N. Nashif, Nuclear Warfare in the Middle East : Dimensions and
Responsibilities . Princeton, New Jersey: Kingston Press, 1984, pp 28-30.
^El-Sayed Selim, op. cit., p 137.
29Bhatia, op. cit., p 52.
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Eizzat Abdel Aziz, an Egyptian physicist working as the Argonne research
center in the United States, noticed two Israeli scientists at the same
institution studying plutonium reprocessing. He reported the weapons
implications of this research to his home office. 30 This report should
have immediately spurred Nasir to raise the priority of the Egyptian
nuclear program, if it was passed along to Nasir. It occurred at a time
however when Nasir had just fired his AEE director for political
insubordination, and so the AEE probably did not receive the budget
priority to oppose the Israeli threat.
Clement Moore believes domestic politics interrupted the
development of the Egyptian nuclear technology infrastructure in 1959,
by firing Rahman. Rahman opposed Nasir' s over -ambitious development
plan to double gross national product in ten years. As the National
Science Council director, Rahman had defined the goals of the scientific
research plan as: (1) support for basic or academic research, (2)
selection of research topics based upon individual scientists'
initiative, (3) equipment support and foreign study assistance, and (4)
applied research. 31 An aggressive, ten-year development plan would
require a basic sciences infrastructure much broader than Egypt
possessed to date. The Science Council's initial budget request was cut
in half. The 1960-1965 five-year science plan requested 19,673,250
pounds, and the government allotted 8,439,893 pounds. 32 According to
Moore, Rahman was relieved of his AEE and Ministerial positions in 1959
and reassigned to a position in the Ministry of Planning where he could
^Ibid., p 54.
31Sabet, op. cit., pp 191-192.
32Ibid., p 193, based upon Sabet's access to Egyptian government documents
No other sources were found to verify these figures.
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no longer influence science policy. 33 Bhatia explains the non sequitur
of Rahman's reassignment as due to some inexplicable personal desire.
Moore's explanation is more consistent with Nasir' s previous history of
silencing uncooperative Free Officers. Rahman, with a foreign degree,
was respected within the Egyptian scientific community, and the Egyptian
atomic development program had only recently begun to bear fruit in the
form of foreign assistance. He would not have left such a position
voluntarily, at that time, unless he had lost Nasir' s personal
confidence and was no longer scientifically independent. Whether any
succeeding AEE directors could have continued the emphasis on basic
science development and training or would have given in to political
pressure for more immediate science applications is unclear. The
successor who emerged did support military applications though.
Prior to Rahman's firing, one observes evidence to support both
the motivational imperatives and the weak state model. The motivational
imperative evidence includes Nasir' s regional power pretensions, Egypt's
quest for military superiority versus Israel, Egypt's low defense
establishment morale after the 1956 war, and future economic spinoffs.
Possible dissuasive restraints include the strategic credibility gap of
Egypt's acquiring nuclear weapons before possessing state-of-the-art,
advanced weapons for conventional forces, and the absence of a perceived
nuclear threat from any state in the region. The weak state hypothesis
is supported by Nasir' s initial appointment of a Free Officer within the
original core of the Revolutionary Command Council as senior
administrator, supposedly a man politically loyal to Nasir, without
technical qualifications, to supervise scientific development. Only in
a weak state would a leader appoint a loyal military man to supervise a
highly technical program. In 1957 Nasir was announced as the chief of
33Moore, op. cit., p 89.
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this state corporation, removing all doubt as to who was in command of
the AEE.
B. APPLIED SCIENCE EMPHASIS
1. Politicization of the Atomic Energy Establishment
The scientific direction of the AEE lapsed from 1959 to 1961.
The Chairman of the Board of Atomic Energy, Kamal al-Din Husayn, wanted
to appoint a Free Officer with a bachelor's degree in chemistry who had
allegedly made nitroglycerin grenades before the revolution, Colonel
Salah Hedayat . Apparently the other members of the board suspected
Hedayat was not technically qualified to be director-general. A
civilian professor was appointed at first, but when it became clear that
he would not receive the political backing of the regime, the other
Board members relented to Hedayat' s appointment in the fall of 1961. 34
Hedayat served for four years as the executive of both the independent
Atomic Energy Establishment and the five year science plan. In
retrospect, this period was the most critical to the frustration of the
Egyptian nuclear weapon effort, because a science community leader who
was not as politically threatening as Hedayat turned out to be, might
have succeeded in making Egypt an atomic power.
In June 19 60 Israel's 1 -megawatt research reactor at Nahal Soreq
began operating. In December West Germany signed an agreement to assist
Egypt with atomic energy development for peaceful purposes 35 . Up to
this point, Egyptian intentions are problematic. Nasir appears to have
been sincerely interested in developing the technology for dual civilian
and military uses in the future, ten years or more distant. The
Egyptian science plan drafted by Rahman probably did not satisfy Nasir'
s
34Moore, op. cit .
, pp 88-89.
35
"Atomic Energy Aid for U. A. R.", London Times
. 5 December 1960, p lOg.
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goals of near -term-future and present -use applications of new
technology. Nasir may have confused the initial progress demonstrated
by acquisition of a research reactor, advanced laboratory equipment, and
cooDeration agreements with Germany, Norway, the United States and the
USSR, as signs that the Egyptian nuclear development program was nearing
the adolescent point when it could stand without foreign assistance.
The events of December 1960 dramatically increased the importance of
Egyptian nuclear technology acquisition beyond a far -distant future
capability.
The New York Times reports of the Israeli power reactor under
construction at Dimona from 19-22 December 1960 sparked a flurry of
Arabic press reports with mixed views on the likelihood of Israel's
going nuclear. 36 This returned Nasir' s attention to the nuclear
technology race with Israel. Possibly this news triggered a decision to
expedite the weapons development efforts of the Egyptian AEE. The
Dimona revelation occurred against a background of a secret nascent
German -Egyptian rocket program, and Nasir' s undisputed leadership of the
Arab nationalist movement.
The public posture which Nasir presented may be better
understood within the Egyptian cultural context. This new reactor posed
a threat to Egypt which had to be answered in some manner - if only
symbolically. Arab collective honor could not be shamed by the
appearance of technological inferiority. Nasir' s public speech
reflected both hope that Israel would not develop atomic weapons, and
his responsibility to protect the Arab states from such an occurrence.
If Israel was developing an atom bomb, it would mean
36Yair Evron, "The Arab Position in the Nuclear Field: A Study of Policies
up to 1967," Cooperation and Conflict , number 1, 1973, pp 21, 30.
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the beginning of a war between us and Israel, because we cannot
permit Israel to manufacture an atomic bomb. It is inevitable that we
would attack the base of aggression, even if we have to mobilize four
million men to destroy it37 .
The United States also perceived this development as a risk to the
stability of the region. President Eisenhower demanded an explanation
from the Israeli Prime Minister during the last three weeks of his
Presidency.
The Israeli development led to the first inter-Arab discussion
on a potential nuclear threat in February 1961, in Baghdad. The Foreign
Ministers approved an Arab plan which included overt measures to urge
the IAEA to investigate the Israeli power reactor under construction, as
well as unmentioned covert measures. After the meeting, Israel and the
Atomic Bomb was published in Arabic by Mustafa Hasan. This book was
published in Beirut, relatively free from government censorship. It
included speculation of the French assistance in bomb development and
suggested Arab duties to respond to the Israeli program. Two months
later the Arab Military Consultative Committee, composed of the military-
chiefs of staff, met to study the Palestinian issue and the Israeli
-
French bomb development program. Both the London press and the Egyptian
press reports on this meeting only mentioned the Israeli nuclear
development perfunctorily. 38 This may indicate Nasir's difficulty in
forging a unified Arab consensus on the issue, only further pushing
Nasir to develop his own capability independently.
This public leak coincided with the change of leadership after
Rahman's departure in 1959, away from emphasis on basic sciences and
overseas training toward military and industrial applications of
"Feldman, op. cit., p 256.
38Evron, op. cit., p 21.
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scientific research. 39 Sometime during 1961 Nasir decided to increase
budget support for those activities which would lead directly to a
nuclear weapons capability: the German- Egyptian rocket program and the
AEE
. A chemical warhead rocket and a cobalt -60 warhead were short-
range, intermediary components of this overall effort at strategic
parity with Israel. This decision may have come immediately after the
December 1960 report or later after the July 1961 public launching of an
Israeli research rocket. 40
In January and February 19 61 German and other foreign national
scientists began consultations with the Egyptians on a plan for an
atomic reactor. 41 In April 1961 a cooperation agreement was signed with
Yugoslavia for extraction of previously discovered uranium and thorium
ore within Egypt. This program matured into an Egyptian ability to
locally produce a measuring device for analyzing radioactive
materials. 42 The Soviet supplied research reactor began operation in
July 1961, two years behind schedule. 43 The ten percent enriched
uranium fuel was supplied by the Soviets. This research reactor was made
safe by the physical presence of Soviet technicians and was not put
under IAEA authority for safeguarding until Egypt ratified the NPT in
1981, however the Egyptians allowed a one-time IAEA inspections in
August 19 60, while it was under construction. 44 The Soviets used their
own bilateral safeguard system to prevent diversion of fuels for making
39Bhatia, op. cit., p 89.
""Frank, op. cit., p 750.
41Nashif, op. cit., p 27.
42E1-Sayed Selim, op. cit., p 137.
43Bhatia, op. cit., p 52.
directory of Nuclear Reactors , Volume III, Vienna: International Atomic
energy Agency, 1960, p 143; Nashif, op. cit . p 27.
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weapons. This construction delay could be explained by the changed
Soviet nuclear export policy after 1958, mentioned above. According to
Bhatia, the Egyptian scientists wanted to upgrade the research reactor
to a larger capacity, but the Soviet specialists advised against that
until after experience was gained from the first reactor. In the summer
of 1961, Salah Hedayat was first appointed Chairman of the Atomic Energy-
Board and Director-General of the AEE, and after the Syrian secession
from the United Arab Republic in September, Hedayat was given a cabinet
level position in the reorganized Nasir government, Minister of
Scientific Research. 45
That the Egyptian atomic development program suffered during
this period from the friction of bureaucratic politics, is a reflection
of Egyptian cultural tendency to create large bureaucracies. 46
Replacing the previous National Science Council, the Ministry of
Scientific Research gave the director cabinet -level authority which the
Science Council had not had beforehand. The Scientific Ministry's exact
organization and functions were officially defined in January 1963. The
AEE remained independent from all other scientific organizations,
directly responsible to the Prime Minister, from 1955 to 1963 and from
1964 to 1967. During 1963-1964 the AEE was attached to the Ministry of
Scientific Research, the final part of Hedayat' s organizational empire-
building. The 1961 reorganization which brought in Hedayat as Science
Minister, Chairman of the Board of Atomic Energy and Director-General of
the AEE, was an integral part of the 1961 socialist reforms. Between
1961 and 1963, Hedayat reorganized the science ministry into eight
functional departments, a department to manage foreign scientific
45Bhatia, op. cit., p 53.
"^Nazih N. M. Ayubi, Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt , London:
Ithaca Press, 1980, pp 497-514.
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relations, and an Academy of Sciences. National science policy emphasis
shifted from basic scientific training and infrastructure to applied
research. According to Moore, the 1960-1965 Science Council plan began
to fall short of its goals by 1963. This may be partly explained by the
science organizational turbulence of this period or the overall domestic
economic downturn which occurred from 1960 to 1965. When Hedayat was
fired, the ensuing reorganization dissolved the ten departments and
created a Supreme Council of Scientific Research, with the AEE reverting
to autonomous status directly under the Prime Minister. 47 According to
El-Sayed Selim, Hedayat was subordinated in May 1964 to Deputy Premier
Kamal El -din Rifaat, (one of the revolution era second- tier Free
Officers 48 , a radical socialist, who had ascended politically to become
one of the Tripartite Commission of the ASU in 19 63 49 ) . Later, when
Rifaat lost Nasir' s confidence Marshal Amer was given supervision of the
Board and the AEE. 50 Amer probably controlled the AEE until after the
June 1967 War when he was politically discredited by military failure.
Alexandria University established a department of nuclear
engineering in 1962. 51 An agreement to develop atomic energy for
"peaceful purposes" with India in 1962 expanded the overseas scientist
training program to include India. 52 In August, according to an Israeli
news report, foreign assistance to Egypt included atomic scientists from
47Sabet, op. cit., pp 189-195 and Moore, op. cit., p 89.
^Dekmejian, op. cit., p 178.
49John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat . Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1975, p 319.
^El-Sayed Selim, 1982, op. cit., p 145.
51Bhatia, op. cit., p 54.
52Evron, 1973, op. cit., p 20.
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Britain (12) , Czechoslovakia, (13) , and Japan (21) , 53 This may be
purely Israeli propaganda, but it would not be inconsistent with open
international nuclear export policy of that period. Previously, in
June, the Nasir regime declared the superiority of applied science over
basic science in the new revolutionary ideology of the National Charter.
Science is the true weapon of the revolutionary will. . . . The
major economic and social problems confronting our people at present
must be solved on a scientific basis. The scientific research centres
are required at this stage of struggle to develop themselves so that
science would be in the service of society. At this stage, science
for its sake is a responsibility with our national potentiality
cannot shoulder. 54
2. Government Budget Support
A key to explaining Egypt's atomic development program is
understanding the division between rhetorical support for advanced
sciences and actual allocation of government resources. This government
budget information is both highly guarded as a national secret and
difficult to divine in practical terms. The government changed its
budgetary fiscal year in 1975 from beginning 1 April to a western
calendar year basis, and again in 1981, from a calendar year basis
returning to a fiscal year beginning 1 July. One opinion is that these
changes were made in order to hide irregularities from potential
creditors or to keep secrets for those years in which the changes were
made. 55 Sabet admits the difficulty in measuring amounts of the
government budget devoted to research within each department and
ministry. Sabet 's research shows that between 1959 and 19 65, scientific
research expenditures had risen both absolutely and as a percentage of
national income. For comparative purposes, three sets of budget data
53Nashif, op. cit., p 27.
54Sabet, op. cit., pp 219-220, (my emphasis).




are given. Table 1 signifies the effect of the Science Council's five-
year plan on the allocation of scientific research in the command
directed economy of 1961-1965.
TABLE 1 . RESEARCH EXPENDITURES IN RELATION TO NATIONAL INCOME
(in millions of Egyptian pounds) 56
Fiscal Year
1959/1961 1962/1963 1963/1964 1964/1965
Total Science 2.3 7.5 7.9 8.0
Research
National Income 1,285.2 1,562.8 1,739.6 1,884.0
Percentage
Research/ Income 0.18 0.48 0.45 0.43
A second standard for measuring the relative accuracy of science
budget data is included as Table 2. The Egyptian science budgets were
probably in the range of six to ten million Egyptian pounds during this
period, which included the Atomic Energy Establishment budget. The
science ministry budget excludes graduate -level research performed at
the Universities in Cairo, Alexandria, Ain Shams and Assuit
.
















56Sabet, op. cit., p 199.
57Sabet, op. cit., p 198.
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Contrary to the above data, the Economist Intelligence Unit
reports show that the 1963/1964 investment budget actually cut
scientific research by 17 percent to 3 . 8 million Egyptian pounds from
4.6 million the previous year while increasing overall state investment




. The following table is presented in order to
gain a sense of the magnitude of the scientific investment budget
compared to other government investment programs during this period. If
the statistics are purely intelligence deception, the relative weights
of each sector are meaningless . Note the closeness in order of
magnitude of the EIU 1962/1963 science expenditures with the Sabet data
from that period. According to Nasir's National Charter, basic science
would not receive a significant portion of the budget compared with
applied science projects such as the High Dam.
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Agriculture 40.3 40.8 54.7
Irrigation 19.4 18.2 13.7
Electricity- 15.3 16.2 22.0
High Dam 12.6 34.6 55.4
Industry- 93.3 115.4 140.5
Transport &
Communications 56.5 33.4 24.0
Suez Canal 18.0 9.3 8.0
Housing 13.2 46.0 36.1
Defense, Public
Security &
Justice - 2.0 2.9
Education - 12.4 9.8
Health - 6.7 6.7
Ministry of Culture - 6.3 9.5
Social and
Religious Services 2.1 2.0
Scientific Research - 4.6 3.8
Storage and
Maintenance - 8.0 16.1
Administration - - 0.4
Commercial and
Financial Services 6.0 4 .4
Total 320.0 362.0 410.1
Antoine Zahlan has argued that the Nasir regime did not commit an
adequate portion of the development budget to science research, or basic
science for either civilian or military technological independence59 .
The above budget statistics point out the bureaucratic competition which
the Science Ministry faced in justifying government budget needs. The
decline in science research from 1962/63 to 1963/64 reflects the fact
that during that period the AEE budget was separate from the Science
Ministry. What cannot be explained is why the AEE could not have
received a substantially higher percentage of the investment budget
given its special autonomy from the Science Ministry. The partial
59Antoine B. Zahlan, "The Science and Technology Gap in the Arab-Israeli
Conflict," Journal of Palestine Studies , Volume 1, Number 3, Spring 1972, pp 17-




explanation may be that Nasir did not want to risk too much on a future
technology which required a high initial investment with years -long
return on investment. Absent a politically- supported scientist like
Rahman, who succeeded in wringing out greater resources from the
government, the AEE was financially supported by less than one tenth of
a percent of the national income in the 1964/65 budget.
3. Steady Progress With Foreign Assistance
The Cairo Radio Isotope Center was renamed the Regional Isotope
Center in 1963 and complied with International Atomic Energy Agency
inspections and safeguards. 60 This is due to the influence of the
United States in establishing the center. Meanwhile the search for a
foreign power reactor continued. In January 1963, a British firm had
begun preliminary discussion with Egyptian representatives for a 250-
megawatt nuclear power station. 61 In May 1963 Al-Ahram announced that
Minister of Science Hedayat signed an agreement with a British
consulting group to analyze economic feasibility and potential sites for
a nuclear power plant. 62 In September, the Israeli press reported that
an Egyptian mission attempted to purchase a 200 megawatt capacity, heavy
water-cooled power reactor from France. 63 This allegation is difficult
to explain since France had continued assistance to Israel through the
1960 Sahara weapons test.
Internationally, both Egypt and Israel supported the nascent
international convention banning certain kinds of tests of nuclear
weapons. Both Israel and Egypt signed the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty
^John K. Cooley, "Cairo Steers Clear of A-race," Christian Science Monitor
,




, Sudan and Libya," EIU number 40, January 1963, pp 3-4.
62E1-Sayed Selim, op. cit., p 138.
63Evron, op. cit., p 20.
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in August 1963. Egypt ratified it five months later 10 January 1964 and
Israel five days later, on 15 January 1964. M Neither state sacrificed
large measures of control by participation in this treaty.
The AEE conducted its own survey in 19 63 for future nuclear
power plant sites. The results of the survey were included in a paper
presented at the 19 64 Third International Conference on the Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy by the Egyptian delegation. 65 The justifications
given for the nuclear power plant were both to fulfill electricity
demand, to introduce nuclear power technology to Egyptian scientists.
The Egyptian plan called for at least one 200 -megawatt power plant
operational by 1972 at one of five surveyed sites. 66 By that time a
West German firm, Siemens, was conducting advanced negotiations for a
natural -uranium fuelled, heavy- water cooled reactor at Burg El Arab.
These plans were cancelled with the German diplomatic rupture the next
year. Sometime in 1964, the Soviets were asked to help establish radio
chemistry "hot labs" at Inchas, which would give Egyptians experience at
nuclear waste handling and waste reprocessing. 67 These plans were
suspended in 1965. Egypt bought 2 kilograms of natural uranium from
Britain in November 1964. ^ This is the first purchase of fissionable
material registered with the IAEA. The initial start-up fuel for the
research reactor remained the responsibility of Soviet technicians.
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agreements, 1982 Edition , Washington D. C: ACDA, 1982, pp 44-45.
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According to Evron, the Israeli nuclear potential was not at the
top of the Arab summit agendas in 1964 and 1965. More likely it was
discussed in high level meetings but kept out of the press. The one
public mention was a resolution after the 1964 summit for establishment
of an inter -Arab body for "Atoms for Peace" , 69 This was the second call
for a joint Arab nuclear development effort, which was never realized in
succeeding attempts through to the present
.
Also in 1964 the Qatarra Depression nuclear power and
desalination project was being considered. This project was opened for
bids as a first of a series of plants along the Mediterranean and Red
Seas coasts. The power plant was to have a capacity of 150 megawatts
and be capable of producing 53 million gallons of water a day, used to
irrigate a 10,000 acre farm. The government reportedly had allocated 28
million Egyptian pounds for the project but expected a large measure of
financing credit. The AEE had even considered use of atomic explosives
to dig an 80 -mile canal from the sea to the point of the nuclear-
agricultural industrial complex. 70
By January 19 65 Egyptian scientists had developed techniques to
extract 6 percent thorium oxide and 4 5 percent uranium oxide from
monazite deposits in the Mediterranean coastal area between Demietta and
Port Said. 71 This foretold a future Egyptian capability to produce
power reactor fuel without foreign help. After the break with West
Germany, negotiations were conducted with three American firms:
Westinghouse, General Electric, and Combustion Engineering. The bids
ranged from $50 to $70 million, but Egypt could not obtain the sizeable
69Evron, op. cit., pp 21-22.
70
"Egypt (UAR)
, Sudan and Libya," EIU, number 47, October 1964, p 2
71E1-Sayed Selim, op. cit., p 155
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credits need to finance the project. 72 The Qatarra Depression project
was declared to be a feasible means of producing electricity and was
programmed to begin in 1968 at a cost of 120 million Egyptian pounds. 73
4. The Egyptian Rocket Program
In the early 1960s, the Israelis considered a cobalt warhead
mounted on the advanced V-2 rocket design to be a plausible threat, and
conducted covert and diplomatic operations to remove the German
scientists from the project. Between 1961 and 1962 as many as 250
German scientists and engineers were in Egypt working on the Egyptian
long-range rocket program. Sometime in 19 61 the Israelis learned of the
Egyptian-German effort. Reportedly the Germans were being paid well for
their services, indicating Nasir's intention to develop a credible
threat. Alone, the estimated $450,000 per year paid to the top four
scientists in 1962, made up one tenth of the 1962 science plan budget (E
1,926,579 pounds) , 74
Former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion explained that the
Israeli rocket launch in July 1961 was performed in order to pressure
the Egyptians to openly announce their own program. The Egyptians
publicly revealed two new types of missiles in the July 24, 1962
Revolution Day parade. One was reported to have a range of 235 miles
and a 1,000 pound conventional explosive warhead and the other a range
of 375 miles and a 1,500 pound warhead. 75
Israeli covert attacks to halt the Egyptian -German rocket
program from 1962 to 1963 were partly successful. Two examples of
72Bhatia, op. cit., p 55; El-Sayed Selim, op. cit . , p 138
73
"Egypt," EIU , number 50, p 7.
74Frank, op. cit., pp 752-753.
75Frank, op. cit., pp 752-753.
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Israeli covert operations are the November 1962 parcel bomb which
exploded in the Cairo office of the chief German scientist, Professor
Wolfgang Pilz, blinding his secretary, and the attempted abduction of a
daughter of a German scientist working in Egypt in March 1963 . The
Israeli agents were arrested in the second incident and during the
ensuing public trial, defended themselves with evidence that Egypt was
developing missiles fitted with cobalt-60 warheads. 76
Israeli and western diplomatic pressure from 1963 to 1965 was
eventually successful in pressuring the German government to withdraw
their scientists from Egypt in March 1965. In 1963 Israeli Foreign
Minister Golda Meir publicly declared that Egypt was developing
radiological (cobalt) , biological and chemical weapons of mass
destruction for use on the rocket under development. By March 1965, a
proposed West German sale of 200 tanks to Israel, and Nasir's reception
of the East German leader Walter Ulbricht in Cairo, directly led to West
Germany recalling all German citizens from Egypt, and a subsequent break
in diplomatic relations between the two governments. 77
The United States was also concerned with the growing perception
of an Egyptian- Israeli arms race at this time. President Johnson
dispatched Under-Secretary of State Talbot to Cairo in April 1965, with
a message that if Egypt did not accept US inspection of nuclear
activities and the rocket program, and limit Egyptian conventional
military forces, the United States would supply Israel with any arms
requested. The larger context of this message was the three-year-old
Egyptian-American trade of $431.8 million in wheat, oils, tobacco and
poultry. Nasir had requested emergency financing of $35 million in
76Howard M. Sachar, Egypt and Israel , New York: Marek Publishers, 1981, pp
131-132.
"^Frank, op. cit .
, pp 753-754.
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September 1964, which was refused. Nasir rejected the American
conditions for continuing agricultural imports and stated that Egypt
refused to freeze the armed forces strength, cease production of rockets
or refrain from seeking nuclear weapons. He implied that he would get
the necessary help from the Soviets. 78
By early 19 65, more evidence appears to support the weak state
model for nuclear proliferation. The necessary condition of motivation
is established. By 1965 the proliferation motivations which may have
influenced Nasir were Israel's potential for developing nuclear weapons,
and Nasir' s pan-Arab appeal for regional power status. Among the
dissuasive factors are the strategic credibility gap favoring
conventional weapons (which is why Nasir attempted to develop Egyptian
rockets able to hit Israeli cities) , threat of Israeli preemptive
intervention, and Egyptian foreign technological dependence coupled with
vulnerability to foreign trade embargoes. The technological constraint
argument is not applicable yet because foreign technical assistance was
relatively unconstrained.
The evidence which supports the weak state hypothesis is the
two-year vacancy of the AEE Director-Generalship after firing Rahman,
appointment of a loyalist Free Officer as the combined director of the
Board of Atomic energy, the AEE, and the Ministry of Scientific
Research, Hedayat's firing at the peak of his bureaucratic empire-
building, the temporary subordination of the AEE (without an approved
Director-General) under Deputy Premier Rifaat (also a Free Officer) , and
the abolition of the Ministry of Scientific Research. This is notable
in the period when Nasir appeared to be strongly supportive of an
Egyptian nuclear weapons capability, allowing Hedayat to grow more
bureaucratically powerful for three years.
78
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5. Request For Weapons Technology
The Egyptian nuclear development program faced a decision point
in the summer and fall of 1965. The AEE director and Science Minister
had been sacked, and reappointed Nasir's personal science advisor.
Diplomatic rupture with Germany terminated a promising Western military
technical assistance program. Perhaps the need for foreign financing
credit and the realization of technological dependance lessened Nasir's
expectations that this advanced technology could be developed during the
short-term future of the next five-year plan. The Egyptian rockets were
no longer displayed after the 1965 Revolution Day parade. 79 Nasir
preferred to keep secret their degree of development before the Germans
pulled out.
The editor of Al-Ahram , Cairo's daily newspaper, Mohamed
Heikal, wrote a full page editorial on 15 October 1965 discussing the
Egyptian position regarding Israel's atomic potential. Heikal first
broached this subject in the previous two months, but he developed it
further at this time. Nasir must have wanted to emphasize the issue
with the Arabic readership for some reason. He had prevented all
mention of it in the official press since his January 1961 interview.
Heikal 's access to Nasir is unquestioned. He co-authored Nasir's
political biography The Philosophy of the Revolution in 1954 . The
editorial sounded the alarm that the "Israeli atomic potential" would be
realized within three years and this danger required Egypt to respond
with preventive action because it was the only state able to face Israel
scientifically, economically, and militarily. It suggested Egypt must
take the initiative and either move for protection or conduct a limited
strike against the Dimona reactor. Heikal suggested Israel's own
response if Egypt acquired atomic weapons first, as either an Israeli
'Frank, op. cit., p 747.
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air or missile strike on the Egyptian atomic center (Inchas) or a total
preventive war begun by an air or missile strike, (implied to be on
Inchas) . Heikal stated that the second five-year plan would establish
heavy industry and electric power for every home and industry.
"Protection" could be interpreted as a Soviet nuclear deterrent
or an Egyptian deterrent of its own. The article implied that Egypt did
not yet possess an equivalent strategic deterrent - that Egyptian
rockets were not a threat to Israeli population centers. Five days
after Heikal 's article, Ahmed Khalifa wrote a lengthy article in
Beirut's Al-Huria echoing the call for a preventive war against Israel
in order to destroy the atomic power reactor at Dimona. 80
Heikal 's public airing of the issue provided the regime the
following domestic political benefits. It reassured the Egyptian people
that the government would do something to solve the problem. It called
for a unified Arab effort unsuccessful so far, militarily and
economically. It could be interpreted as a request for Arab investment
funds to support Egypt's nuclear program. It appealed to the other Arab
states to support Egypt's warnings of Israeli atomic potential at the
Casablanca summit just passed. Perhaps it was an appeal for Egypt's own
businessmen to help finance the program. Such a pronouncement may also
have been intended to soften Soviet resistance to technical assistance
requested.
The public pronouncement in October, taken together with the
direct approach to the Soviets two months later to buy nuclear weapons
(or the weapons technology) , is the watershed event proving the weak
state model. 81 It shows the dynamic effect of domestic security
80Evron, op. cit., p 22.
81Hedrick Smith, "Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense," New York Times ,
4 February 1966, pp 1 , 12.
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priorities and international security priorities on leadership
decisions. Nasir had fired the AEE director who had strongly pursued
the military applications of this technology, for domestic political
security. Less than two years later, Nasir wanted nuclear weapons for
international security reasons. Moscow refused to provide Cairo with
nuclear weapons or weapons technology, but promised a "guarantee of
protection if Israel developed or obtained such weapons". Evron
suggests that although the Egyptian officially denied these reports, the
public knowledge of a possible Soviet guarantee did not damage Egypt's
official position as a neutral power and allowed by Moscow and Cairo
diplomatic maneuver space to involve the US and prevent Israel from
using nuclear weapons in war. 82
6. Conflicting Signals
After the failed approach to the USSR in 1965, the Egyptian
nuclear development program was apparently relegated to secondary
importance. Table 4 shows that the first two years of the second five-
year plan reflect a decrease in both AEE and total science budgets below
the first five-year plan. Nasir wanted to limit both the AEE and
Science Ministry after 1964, to preclude Hedayat's successor from
consolidating bureaucratic power. Note the increase in the National
Research Center (NRC) budget in 1966/1967.
KEvron, op. cit., pp 28-29.
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TABLE 4. RESEARCH BUDGETS (in millions of Egyptian Pounds)
Fiscal Year
1962/1963 1964/1965 1965/1966 1966/1967
Atomic Energy- 2.397 2.255 1.145 1.147
Ministry of Science
Research 3.843 4 .187 2.776 3.023
(NRC) (1.238) * (1.166) (1.425)
Subtotal 6.240 6.442 3.921 4.169
* NRC budget allocated to Ministry of Science from 1963-1964
In October 1965 the Supreme Council of Scientific Research was
established to improve science coordination between the executive policy
making and the research institutes. 84 This council may be what Heikal
referred to as a new ministry. The above reference to a Ministry of
Science Research appears to contradict the report that the Science
Ministry was abolished in 1965. 85 According to Sabet, a new council for
the Promotion of Scientific Research continued the functions of the
dissolved Science Ministry from 1964 until the Supreme Council of
Scientific Research was formed in 1965. The Science Ministry was
officially revived under the cabinet reorganization accompanying the 30
March 1968 Statement. The council president held ministerial rank and
was directly responsible to the Prime Minister. The Director of the AEE
was a member of the Supreme Council for Scientific Research and also
directly responsible to the Prime Minister. Dr Hussein Sait, a former
Free Officer, and a respected academic who had run the NRC in the mid
1950s, was appointed Chairman of the Board of Atomic Energy. El
Guibaily was appointed Director-General of the AEE. Both apparently had
respected scientific credentials. Sait attempted to change Hedayat's
emphasis on applied research, but the resulting staff was overburdened
83Sabet, op. cit., p 198
84Ibid.
, p 189.
85Moore, op. cit., p 90.
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with daily operations of the research- institutional empire Hedayat had
built, and the state budget cuts prevented basic science development. 86
In 1966 the Israeli atomic threat made repeated headlines in
international press. The Soviet nuclear guarantee was unofficially
admitted in February to the New York Times reporter covering the
story. 87 By this time Nasir believed Israel had the capability to make
atomic weapons, but he was not sure about Israel's intentions. 88 During
an interview with an Iraqi reporter on 20 February 1966 Nasir emphasized
that "preventive action" was the first Arab line of defense against the
Israeli atomic threat. He said: "If Israel proceeds with the
production of am atomic bomb then I believe the only answer to this is a
preventive war" . 89 Two months later in an American television
interview, Nasir again threatened a "preventive war, " if it could be
conclusively proven that Israel was developing atomic weapons.
They have a reactor, 24 megawatt, and they have the plutonium.
What would be the result? The result would be to produce atomic
weapons. 90
A month later in a British television interview for British
viewers, Nasir repeated the preventive war message, adding that Egypt
was now considering developing nuclear weapons because Israel was
86Ibid., p 90; Bhatia, op. cit., p 53.
^Hedrick Smith, "Soviets Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense, " New York Times ,
4 February 19 66, pp 1, 12.
88Khalil Shikaki, "The Nuclearization Debates: The Cases of Israel and
Egypt," Journal of Palestine Studies , Volume 14 number 4, Summer 19 85, p 84.
89Hedrick Smith, "Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser, " New York Times , 21
February 1966, p ??
'""Nasser Threatens to War on a Nuclear-Armed Israel," New York Times , 18
April 1966, p 6.
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developing nuclear technology. 91 The issue of preventive war before
Israel would achieve nuclear weapons capability was repeated again over
Radio Cairo on both 9 September and 9 December 1966. On 9 September the
broadcast mentioned the possibility of American guarantees that Israel
would not resort to atomic weapons built with its own reactor. This is
a questionable guarantee, given Israel's control over US inspections of
the Dimona reactor. 92
Although Nasir had fired Hedayat in 1964, he reportedly
supported Hedayat 's covert attempt to develop a complete nuclear fuel
cycle from 1965 to 1970, under the cover business, Design Consultants
Agency. Defense Minister Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer also supported
Hedayat' s goal of developing a weapons capability. Egyptian scientists
working overseas and in the AEE were recruited into DCA, and the
organization was government -financed. The extent of government funding
is not known. The AEE jealously competed with this program and
described Hedayat 's proposals as unfeasible. Hedayat 's proposals
included a uranium extracting plant, a plutonium-yielding power reactor
and a waste fuel reprocessing facility. 93 DCA' s existence is not
mentioned by any other authors in the literature, so it must have been a
well-kept secret.
In December 1966 Economist Intelligence Unit reported that
Kuwait had donated one million US dollars to Egypt "to be used in any
way the president saw fit." Reportedly this money would go to Cairo
University for "practical" modern scientific equipment. It could have
been allocated to the AEE.
9lUnited Press International, "Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms," New York
Times , 9 May 1966, p 8.
^Evron, op. cit., pp 24-25, 29.
^Bhatia, op. cit., pp 56-57.
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7. Intra-Elite Power Struggle
It is instructive to examine Nasir's balancing of the factions
within the former Revolutionary Command Council. Marshall Amer became
first official Vice President in March 1964. The Arab Socialist Union
(ASU) became a threat to Nasir after Ali Sabri was appointed Secretary-
General of the party in March 1965. By May 1967 the High Commission on
the Liquidation of Feudalism released its initial report correcting the
unequal application of land reforms in Egypt. The report effectively
sanctioned selected wealthy landowners' resistance to the land reform
laws which had been passed to date, and weakened the other rural
classes' expectations of socialist reforms. Nasir had appointed the
commission as a response to public outcry over the alleged murder in May
1966, of a nouveau riche landowning villager by his aristocratic rival.
Egyptian village society had adjusted to three increasingly severe land
reform laws, in 1952, 1956 and 1961, with the pre -revolutionary elites
retaining most of their political control. Nasir's decision to convene
a commission and appoint Marshall Amer undermined the authority of the
Arab Socialist Union, under whose jurisdiction this matter should have
been investigated, functionally. The HCLF's year-long proceedings
demonstrated to the regime elites in both the ASU and the army, that the
President was more concerned with weakening potential political rivals
than with pressing his socialist modernizing agenda. The findings of
the HCLF report, and Nasir's subsequent dismissal of the report after
the June War, weakened morale in both the Egyptian army and in the ASU,
and showed that Nasir was not serious about land reform after all. 94
This intra-elite power struggle is an example of Nasir's attempt to
discredit the ASU and neutralize the army in 1966 and 1967.
94Hamied Ansari , Egypt : The Stalled Society , Albany New York: State
University of New York Press, 1986, pp 97-151.
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Nasir's treatment of the Atomic Energy Establishment in the mid-
1960' s is remarkably similar to his political employment of the ASU.
The ASU was a mass state political party created in 19 62 in order to
mobilize political support, because the earlier attempts had failed. 95
Contrary to the earlier two parties, the ASU was given more political
power by its structure and Nasir's intent. When the ASU proposed in
1965 more radical socialist reforms than Nasir had endorsed, including
ASU control over the army, Nasir faced a genuine political threat to his
military supported regime. As a result, Nasir first created watchdog
agencies and finally discredited the ASU leadership in 1968.
The AEE was not functionally a political mobilization tool, but
it could have allied with those former Free Officers opposed to Nasir's
policies. Hedayat used his position as the Minister of Science
Research, chairman of the Atomic Energy Board and Director General of
the AEE, to expand the organization to include administratively
incorporating the AEE under the Ministry of Scientific Research.
Hedayat, being a former military officer, favoring military applications
of nuclear technology, would have posed a natural threat to ally with
other military officers with or without Marshal Amer, in opposition to
Nasir.
During the period 19 .-1963, the Presidential Council was
established to restore presidential power over the military. Marshal
Amer resisted this until Nasir relented and the Presidential Council was
dissolved in March 1964. Marshal Amer was appointed First Vice
President. Kamal al-Din Husayn, and Abd al-Litaf Baghdadi, members of
the Presidential Council, resigned in opposition to Nasir's yielding to
Marshal Amer. 96 According to Moore, Colonel Salah Hedayat was a protege





of Kamal al-Din Husayn. 97 This may entirely explain why Nasir relieved
Hedayat of his duties in 19 64 and assigned someone outside the inner
circle of five former Free Officers, less threatening to Nasir, to
temporarily supervise the AEE . Disregarding his alliance to Kamal al-
din Husayn, Hedayat remained a threat to ally with other Free Officers
opposed to Nasir. Later in the October 1965 reorganization of the
government, Marshal Amer was probably given supervision of the AEE. At
that time, Ali Sabri , the ASU chief, was excluded from the inner core of
five former RCC men at the top of the regime. 98 This rapid succession
of three officers to supervise the AEE during 1964-1965, demonstrates
that a Free Officer in charge of the AEE was viewed as a political
threat to Nasir.
8 . The Setback
The Egyptian loss of the 1967 War forced Nasir to remove the
military from domestic political control and to rearm the military
conventionally. Did this mean cutting back on the AEE and DCA budgets
also? Bhatia believes that government funding was frozen for such
projects. 99 Dr. Mohamed Azat Salama, Minister of Education, was
appointed the new chairman of the Board of Atomic Energy in 1967,
probably as part of Nasir' s government reorganization after the war.
El Gubaily continued as Director-General of the AEE. If changing the
leadership position is any indicator of Nasir' s commitment, then he
remained committed to weapons applications. Nasir periodically
reshuffled his government cabinet to demonstrate publicly his commitment
to develop Egypt despite corrupt, unreliable or inefficient high
administrators
.
^Moore, op. cit., p 89
^Dekmejian, op. cit., p 182.
"Bhatia, op. cit., p 57.
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Immediately after the war Nasir sent his AEE director to China
with a personal letter requesting assistance in weapons applications
research. This was a most serious attempt to directly obtain weapons
applications of nuclear technology. Heikal implies that Nasir feared
Israel would use its potential to develop atomic weapons in the post-war
negotiations. Nasir reminded Chou of an earlier promise after China
demonstrated its bomb, not to "keep a monopoly on this scientific
achievement"
. Chou sympathetically received the delegation, but
insisted that Egypt would have to develop this technology without
outside help. According to Heikal, there were no hard feelings in Egypt
about this decision. 100
Apparently the decision to transfer nuclear weapons technology
as the Soviets did to China in the 1950s, and the French did to the
Israelis from 1956-1960, was no longer customary by 1967. The Soviets
and the US had been conducting negotiations for some form of non-
proliferation agreement since the 1963 Test Ban Treaty. The
international context of weapons technology transfer had changed by 19 67
to the point were China, a relative pariah state which refused to sign
the 1968 NPT, still would not transfer weapons technology to an ally in
the international non-aligned movement.
A look at Chinese economic aid to Egypt over the period 1956 to
1968 underscores Mao's refusal and the extent of Nasir' s desperation,
for technical nuclear assistance. Table 5 summarizes economic aid to
Egypt, other Middle Eas - regional states and North Vietnam for
comparison. Communist Chinese economic foreign assistance is
inconsistent to every state but North Vietnam during this period. Aid
to Egypt shows a curious surge in 19 64 at the peak of Egyptian financial
commitments to nuclear technology development. One explanation for this
l00Heikal, 1973, op. cit .
, p 313.
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is that the new Chinese foreign economic aid policy announced in January
1964 obliged China to provide unprecedented support to Egypt, in order
to "win" other African non-aligned nations from Soviet influence. This
aid could have included Egyptian scientists training in mainland China
during the year China exploded a bomb. This surge may reflect Nasir's
attempt to improve relations with Mao in 1964, when Mao could provide
advanced nuclear technologies such as waste reprocessing. Nasir's
approach to a state who had cut off economic aid for three consecutive
years indicates the lengths to which he was willing to go for nuclear
weapon technology.
TABLE 5 . COMMUNIST CHINESE ECONOMIC AID TO SELECTED STATES











* Interest Free Loan
Sources: (1) Japan External Trade Organization, "How To Approach
the China Market," 1972;
(2) Alexander Ekstein, "Communist China's Economic Growth
and Foreign Trade," 1966
(3) US Congress Joint Economic Committee, "An Economic
Profile of Mainland China, " 1968 and "Peoples Republic of China: An
Economic Assessment," 1972.
Year Egypt Alqeria Syria Yemen Pakistan
1955 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1956 4.7 - - - -
1957 - - - - -
1958 - - - 12.7 -
1959 - - - 0.7 -
1960 - - - - -
1961 - - - - -
1962 - 1.8 - - -
1963 - 50.0* 16.3 0.2 -
1964 80.0 - - 28.5 60.0
1965 - - - - -
1966 - - - 15.0 -
1967 - - 21.0 - 9.0
1968 - - - 12 .0 40.0
101 S. K. Gosh and Sreedhar, "China's Foreign Aid Program," from Gosh and
Sreedhar, eds
.
, China's Nuclear and Political Strategy , New Delhi, Young Asia
Publications, 1975, pp 161-166.
57
From 1967 to 1970 many Arab publications were written about the
Israeli bomb potential but no significant outbursts of preventive war or
development of an Egyptian capability, came from Nasir or Heikal, as in
1961 and 1966. The Arabic books published on this subject in Cairo
during this period include: (1) Effects of the Atomic Weapons on
International Relations and Strategies of Force , 1967, (2) A Brief Study
of the Israeli Military Establishment , 1968, (3) A Look at the Danger ,
1968, (4) Israeli Nuclear Policy , 1970, and (4) a revision of number one
above in 1971. The books published in Beirut may have been less
influenced by the government and more critical of the Arab position:
(1) Secrets of the Israeli Military , 1969, (2) Israel: A Military
Society , 1971, and (3) Israel and Nuclear Weapons , 1971, also published
in English. These works suggested that Israel possessed between 26 and
61 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient for six bombs, and that Israel had
both missile and aircraft delivery vehicles. 102
This sudden outpouring of Arabic publications on the subject and
Nasir' s own silence makes sense if Nasir had diverted his emphasis from
Egyptian atomic capabilities to rebuilding conventional armed forces
capability. Marshal Amer had promoted a politically- reliable senior
officer leadership incompetent to lead in battle. Before 1967 Nasir
depended upon the army to remain loyal to him and to guard against any
counter - coups . After 1967, Nasir created a presidential guard force to
strengthen his defense against a possible coup. He attempted to
depoliticize, and professionalize the officer corps to be able to fight
in combat effectively. Nasir' s emphasis on conventional equipment from
the USSR and training from Russian technicians from 1968 to 1970 and his
public silence about an Israeli atomic threat which even the Arabic
intellectual world in Beirut could not ignore, suggest a change in
l02Shikaki, op. cit .
, pp 84, 90.
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support for the Egyptian Atomic Energy Establishment. Shikaki suggests
that Nasir hoped after the 1967 war to use the NPT Treaty to contain
Israel's unconfirmed weapons program. 103
In June 1969 Egyptian scientists were telling western
journalists publicly that Egypt had decided not to compete in the
regional nuclear arms race. 104 Egyptian infrastructure included the
Inchas primary research center, eleven laboratories at the Cairo
Regional Isotope Center, and Alexandria University Institute of Nuclear
Engineering. In December 1969, the Soviets transferred 80 grams of
plutonium to Egypt under the terms of a bilateral transfer agreement. 105
As Egypt's research reactor used natural uranium, this transfer
indicates Egypt's continued interest in advanced nuclear technology,
whether for civilian or military uses. Sometime in 1970, India extended
the cooperation begun in 1957 with an agreement to perform joint
research in heavy water production, fuel fabrication, and raw-materials
extraction. 106 All three of these aspects are dual -use technologies
with civilian power and possible military weapons applications.
Colonel Muammar Qadaffi visited Nasir shortly after his rise to
power in September 1969. 107 During the strategic military review of the
Arab- Israeli conflict, Nasir admitted that the Israelis probably
possessed nuclear bombs and that Egypt did not . Three months later
Qadaffi' s Prime Minister, Major Abdul Salaam Jalloud, consulted with
Nasir on his way to Peking to buy a "tactical atomic bomb." Nasir
103Shikaki, op. cit., p 86.
104Cooley, June 1969, op. cit., pp 1,4.
""Congressional Research Service, 1982, op. cit., p 294.
106Bhatia, op. cit. p 59.
107Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan , New York: New York Times Book
Company, 1975, pp 76-77.
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responded that atomic bombs were never for sale but allowed Jalloud an
Egyptian passport in order to make the trip incognito. Chou En-Lai
refused Jalloud' s personal request just as he had refused El Gubaily'
s
mission presenting Nasir's personal request in 1967. While China would
provide research support (whatever that meant) , the actual weapons
production would have to be done unassisted - every nation must be self-
reliant in this matter.
Nasir encouraged Hedayat's attempts to develop a joint Egyptian-
Libyan nuclear fuel cycle capability. When Nasir agreed to form a joint
Federation with Libya in 1970, Hedayat was appointed Federation Minister
of Scientific Cooperation. 108 Apparently Qadaffi wanted results quicker
than Hedayat could promise, and Nasir did not feel inclined to pool his
scientific infrastructure with Qadaffi' s money for a joint project. The
new Egyptian- Libyan alliance was an alliance of unequals and Nasir could
have attempted to extract a financial commitment from Qadaffi, but
apparently did not.
The evidence to support the weak state hypothesis is
strengthened during the period 1964-1967. The contrast of the
institutional turmoil of the AEE under five successive chiefs (Hedayat,
Deputy Premier Rifaat, Marshal Amer 109 , Deputy Prime Minister Hussein
Sait, and Minister of Education Azat Salama) with Nasir's direct
attempts to buy weapons technology from the USSR in 1965 and from the
PRC in 19 67 underscore the threat that the AEE represented to the
President. The Supreme Council for Scientific Research was reorganized
to replace Hedayat's Ministry of Scientific Research. Alone, the
108Bhatia, op. cit . p 66.
109E1 Sayed Selim provides the only hint of this supervision by Rifaat and
Marshal Amer. This suspicion is not corroborated in the other literature, but
it is not inconsistent with other references to AEE leadership succession, nor
is it inconsistent with Nasir's political leadership at the time.
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succession of AEE leaders could possibly be explained by lack of
scientific progress, but taken in the context together with declining
government budgets and the rivalry with Hedayat's DCA, it becomes
apparent that Nasir wanted nuclear capability but not the potential
domestic threat to his weak state regime.
The motivational model argues that Nasir wanted to go nuclear at
this time. The traditional international security approach explains the
attempted outright buying of nuclear weapons in both instances . In the
first instance, the Israeli nuclear potential forced Nasir to seek a
matching capability, or surrender his role as pan-Arab revolutionary
leader. In the second instance, loss of the war and discrediting of
Egypt's military capabilities as well as demoralization of the officer
corps (Nasir' s weakening political support base) were strong influences
to seek weapons directly, not invest in them for ten years. Dissuasive
conditions during this period are the Israeli precedent of covert
preemption of the German rocket program, and Soviet discouragement from
acquiring the advanced weapons technology. The traditional approach
does not explain why the regime undercut its own agency in one instance
and then sought weapons in the next
.
9 . Economic Defense Burden
The result of the June War which most appreciably affected
Egypt's atomic development was the overall economic impact of Suez canal
revenues lost. The resulting large foreign deficit destroyed Egypt's
chances of receiving the amounts of foreign aid necessary for a nuclear
power reactor. According to an American study presented in 19 67, a 525-
megawatt power reactor was the size necessary for a cost effective plant
to drive an agricultural -industrial complex, but the start-up investment
was estimated at $300-555 million and annual operating costs were
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estimated to be $48-75 million. 110 Another cost estimate for a large
power reactor start-up in 1966 for Egypt, was $300 million, compared
with a defense budget of $437 million. 1 " This hints at the
relationship of nuclear power costs to conventional military defense
budgets
.
Egypt was not a likely candidate to go nuclear in order to save
money on conventional forces, before 1970. An argument exists for
evaluating the economic burden of conventional weapons and the
likelihood of going nuclear to get more "bang for the buck" . One
criterion of an intolerable defense expenditure burden is a spending
level of ten percent of gross national product on defense for three
consecutive years with a zero or positive rate of growth." 2 The
available sources of Egypt's Gross National Product (GNP) and Military-
Expenditures (MILEX) are of questionable accuracy. However two of the
accepted sources provide a comparison basis within each data set. In
1960, US CIA director John McCone estimated the initial costs for a
plutonium weapons program to be $50 million. Meyer's zero-base case
cost estimate in 1960 dollars is $61 million." 3 Recall the Science
Ministry budget in 1964 was 4.187 million Egyptian pounds and the
separate AEE budget was 2.255 million Egyptian pounds.
""Edward A. Mason, "An Analysis of Nuclear Agro- Industrial Complexes," from
Nader and Zahlan, eds
.
, Science and Technology in Developing Countries ,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969, p 135.
'"Cooley, June 1969, op. cit., p 4.




TABLE 6 . CONVENTIONAL FORCES DEFENSE BURDEN
(in millions of dollars)
Year Gross Domestic Military PERCENT GNP MILEX PERCENT
Investment 114 Exo. [i MIL Exo /GNP 116 GNP
(base 1965) (base 1961) (base 1972)
1950 37.9 3.9 %
1951 46.0 4 .7 %
1952 44.1 4.9 %
1953 44.2 4.6 %
1954 57.9 5.7 %
1955 89.9 8.4 %
1956 89.7 8.0 %
1957 66.1 5.5 %
1958 76.8 6.1 %
1959 82.2 6.0 %
1960 597 102.5 7.0 %
1961 711 109.8 7.1 %
1962 664 141.9 8.5 %
1963 806 208.0 11.0 % 483 7 8.6 %
1964 884 511 7 8.6 %
1965 952 586 7 9.2 %
1966 894 457 6 7 .1 %
1967 756 422 6.7 %
1968 681 573 6 8.9 %
1969 742 655 7 9.6 %
10. Domestic Arms Industry
The limited science base of Egypt restricted efforts to build
rockets and airplanes for the following reasons, according to Zahlan:
(1) inadequate university research, (2) over -dependence on foreign
technicians, (3) the army project managers did not have adequate
technical training, (4) international isolation from similar projects
overseas, (5) failed manufacturing quality control, (6) inadequate
computer facilities, and (7) absence of in-house staff development and
1MWorld Tables 1976 , World Bank, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1976, pp 90-91.
lis.Nadav Safran, From War to War . New York: Pegasus, 19 69, p 14 8.
' 1 6World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963-1973 , Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975, p 31.
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training." 7 Some of these same qualities could be applied to the
Egyptian atomic development program under Nasir.
By 1969, Nasir' s frustration with the Egypt's domestic arms
industry must have convinced him to reduce his investment in an atomic
research program with uncertain and at best distant -future returns.
Domestic arms production had failed for four reasons: (1) insufficient
financing, (2) overproduction of Western-modeled items incompatible with
Soviet arms imports, (3) the absence of export markets for Egyptian made
western-designed items, and (4) intra-elite political rivalries.
Nasir' s decision in 1964 to make the military factories for-profit
government- subsidized corporations, led to a gradual conversion from
military hardware to commercial appliances. In May 1969 Nasir abolished
the Ministry of Military Production and ordered the conversion of the
aircraft factories (with 100 million Egyptian pounds previous
investment) into maintenance workshops. In July Nasir announced
negotiations with the Soviets for military- industrial assistance." 8
The causes of failure of the Egyptian aircraft industry may help explain
the slowed atomic development program. Both required western technology
assistance. The 1964 decision to introduce profit as a criteria for
military factories coincides with Nasir' s reorganization of the
leadership of the AEE
.
11. Nasir' s Legacy
According to El-Sayed Selim, Gamal Abd al-Nasir's regime brought
progress in planning and goal setting for civilian energy applications
of nuclear technology. However in the process, individual scientific
training suffered. Sabet, Zahlan, and Moore all support the argument
"7Zahlan, 1972, op. cit., p 25.
" 8Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, "Egypt," from James Everett Katz, ed. , Arms
Production in Developing Countries , (out of print) New York: Free Press, 1984,
pp 132-134. The 1969 exchange rate for one Egyptian pound was $2.30.
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that politics forced the capable Egyptian scientists to seek
professional work overseas rather than develop a nuclear bomb under
Nasir. The increasing trend by 1966 of scientists in all fields to
emigrate, suggests that the limited research budgets of the command
economy since 1961 further restricted by the profit motive after 1964 to
produce civilian applications, cumulatively diminished scientific
progress within the AEE .
"
9
By the time of Nasir' s death in September 1970, the Egyptian
atomic research infrastructure possessed a small research reactor, some
laboratory facilities, research quantities of uranium and plutonium, and
an indeterminate but significant pool of scientists trained overseas and
in Egypt. The scientists may have received limited experience with
waste fuel reprocessing in India. The Soviets refused to transfer
weapons-application technology to the scientists trained in Russia. The
government had solicited bids for state-of-the-art large power and
desalination projects but could not finance them. The originally
flexible Soviet nuclear export policy became restricted from export dual
technologies after their experience with the Chinese ploy of "nuclear
chicken" over the Quemoy-Matsu Islands in 1958.
After 19 65 Egypt lost its political support from the US and
Germany, two states which might have exported dual use technologies such
as a large power reactor. Possibly the global non-proliferation trend
and Egyptian financial shortfalls prevented Egypt from acquiring a power
reactor for legitimate civilian uses after 1967. Nasir' s brightest
prospect in competing with the perceived Israeli threat after 1967, was
to pursue a policy of ambiguity and secrecy, allowing other Arab leaders
and the Arab press to air the issue publicly. The near military coup
u9Sabet, op. cit
. , pp 207-210; Zahlan, 1972, op. cit., 1972, pp 17-36;
Moore, op. cit., pp 87-90, 97-99.
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after the June 1967 War diverted Nasir's attention from countering the
Israeli threat to consolidating domestic support, professionalizing the
army and creating an elite presidential guard unit.
By 1969 the failed Egyptian military aircraft industry and the
failed Egyptian medium range rocket program conditioned Nasir to oppose
large investments necessary to develop the atomic research program
further. The AEE and Salah Hedayat's DCA were allowed to continue a
nominal research effort for training new scientists. Nasir hoped that
the DCA would draw funding support from other Arab states such as
Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. As far as facing the Israeli
nuclear threat, Nasir would have to rely on the uncertain Soviet nuclear
umbrella. Egyptian chemical weapons used in Yemen were not yet fitted
to a strategic missile delivery vehicle capable of threatening Israel.
The period from late 1967 to Nasir's death in September 1970
does not give strong evidence for either the weak state hypothesis or
the motivational hypothesis. This is the period when the technological
hypothesis is suggested to explain the non-event. Supposedly, the high
cost of buying a economically feasible power reactor prevented Egypt
from being able to finance one. This is true enough taken at face
value. But what is not discussed is the cost of building a smaller, 20-
30 megawatt reactor, more the scale of the Israeli reactor at Dimona,
compared with Egypt's defense budget. Clement Moore's suggestion of
intellectual paralysis of the Egyptian scientific community is an
alternate technological hypothesis explanation for lack of success.
That paralysis, if it existed, can be explained as an outcome of the
weak state methods Nasir used to coopt or demote the AEE into his ruling
regime elites. Scientists may have avoided producing legitimate
research to avoid losing their livelihood as a part of the state.
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C. NEW REGIME LEADERSHIP
President Anwar El -Sadat revived the Egyptian nuclear program once
he had consolidated power in May of 1971. From 1970 to 1977 the
government secretly debated the Egyptian response to Israel's nuclear
potential. Those reportedly in favor of developing an Egyptian nuclear
capability were Ali Sabri , General Sadek, Ahmed Sidqi, Ismail Fahmy and
Mohamed Heikal. 1 This argument was initially couched in terms of Soviet
nuclear supply. The pro-nuclear camp argued for either a Soviet nuclear
arms delivery capability in Egypt or a Soviet guarantee against future
Israeli threats. Sadat did not want to pay the political price of
nuclear dependence on the USSR. 2 Sadat initially needed to broaden his
appeal and form a new ruling coalition. This led to a formal reversal
at first (more for show than function), of Nasir's two programs which
were most widely opposed - the socialistic command- economy and the
imprisonment of political dissenters. Sadat's gradual appeal to western
sources of political and economic support and turning away from the USSR
is a more subtle example of this attempt to legitimate his own rule as
different than the popular Nasir. As part of this attempt to distance
himself from Nasir and broaden his ruling elite coalition, Sadat
supported minor government programs which Nasir had discontinued. One
example is the abolished Ministry of Military Production, which was
restored in 1971. 3 Most likely Sadat initially supported the AEE which
had fallen out of political favor after 1964. Supporting an Egyptian
nuclear bomb program would have reinforced his appeal to the Egyptian
'Amos Perlmutter, Michael Handel, Uri Bar- Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad ,
London: Valentine, Mitchell and Company, 19 82, p 33; Etel Solingen, "The Domestic
Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution of Nuclear Ambiguity in the Middle
East," (draft) to be published in International Studies Quarterly , Volume 38,
Number 4, June 1994, p 52.
2Uri Bar- Joseph, "The Hidden Debate: The Formation of Nuclear Doctrines in
the Middle East," Journal of Strategic Studies , Volume 5 Number 2, June 1982, p
207.
3E1-Sayed Selim, 1984, op. cit., p 135.
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officer corps and those elite bureaucrats who would like to see a
stronger Egypt
.
1. Science and Technology
Dr. Ahmed Mustafa, the previous Minister of Education was
appointed the new chairman of the Board of Atomic Energy sometime in
1970, probably after Sadat became President. El Guibaily remained on as
Director General of the AEE . Mustafa's appointment placed a loyalist in
charge of this sensitive minor ministry without disrupting the
scientific direction of the AEE. The Arab Cooperation Agreement for the
Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes became effective in November
1970. 4 This may have forced Sadat into a political stance opposed to
nuclear weapons very early in his regime.
Transfers of plutonium from the Soviets in 1969 and 1970 are not
addressed in the available literature. Egypt received 16 grams of
plutonium from the USSR in November 1970, as part of the existing
bilateral cooperation agreement. This is a small amount of plutonium
when compared to the amount transferred the previous year, but in light
of the greater trend of Soviet exports of fissionable materials reported
to the IAEA (Table 7) , this suggests a Soviet attempt to influence the
new Sadat regime, promising further Soviet assistance.
TABLE 7 . SOVIET AND SOVIET BLOCK FISSIONABLE MATERIAL EXPORTS



















































* less than 1 milligram
"Jabber, 1981, op. cit., pp 33-34.
Congressional Research Service, 1980, op. cit., pp 294-300.
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When Soviet leaders visited Egypt for the Aswan High Dam opening
in January 1971, they reportedly offered to supply nuclear power
plants. 6 This offer was probably of the light -water-moderated type
power reactor, not capable of producing waste products for military use,
judging by all previous and succeeding exports. Regardless of the type
reactor, Sadat's emerging pro-Western position in early 1971 implies
that he would oppose any Soviet offer requiring Soviet technicians to
run the plant
.
In July 1971, Al-Ahram reported the AEE had fifty scientists
working primarily in desalination and the use of peaceful explosions for
excavation and petroleum extraction. 7 The Egyptian scientists presented
scientific rationale for a civilian nuclear program at the Fourth
International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in
September 1971. At this conference Egyptian papers were presented on
the usefulness of atomic power for electricity, desalination,
excavation, and natural gas exploration. 8 El Gubaily and company
presented significant justifications which were apparently credibly
received by the international scientific community. The projected
electricity production capacity deficit of 500 megawatts during the
period 1976-1980 was to be met with a 300-400 megawatts power reactor.
A 50 -megawatt, natural uranium, heavy- water-moderated reactor was
proposed as the type needed for desalinating water for agricultural,
6John K. Cooley, "Cairo Assessing Nuclear Strength," Christian Science
Monitor , 2 January 1975, p 4.
7Paul Jabber, "A Nuclear Middle East," from Gabriel Sheffer, Milton
Leitenberg, editors, Great Power Intervention in the Middle East , Elmsford New
York: Pergamon Press Inc, 1979, p 78.
United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency, Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy
, New York: UN/IAEA, 1972. El Koshairy, El Gubaily, El Hamamsy,
Effat, Taher, and El Fouly, "Possibilities of Introducing and Integrating Nuclear
Power in the Egyptian Power System," volume 1, pp 241-256; El Gubaily, Effat,
El Fouly, El Kholy, El Meshad, Gaddis, Fouad, Marey, Haroun, Sayed, "Studies for
the Potential Use of Nuclear Desalination in Egypt," volume 6, pp 115-130; El
Gubaily, El Shazly, Diab, "Prospects of Peaceful Applications of Nuclear
Explosions in Egypt," volume 7, pp 233-245.
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industrial, and civilian demand. The peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE)
analysis, supported by geological survey data, expected existing nuclear
weapons states to execute PNE service in Egypt under the provisions of
the Nonproliferation Treaty.
The civilian electricity findings were corroborated by the IAEA in a
market survey performed in September 1973. The AEE later published a
paper refuting the economic feasibility of nuclear desalination projects
in 1974, after Gubaily had retired from the AEE. 9
From his perspective as a physics professor at American
University in Beirut, Zahlan assessed the Israeli and Arab nuclear
capabilities in the spring of 1972. He estimated that Israel either had
a nuclear weapon at that time or could produce one within one year. "No
Arab State has so far made any serious attempt to acquire the rudiments
of nuclear know-how, let alone acquire an option." 10 This contradicts
Meyer's analysis of the Egypt's latent capability to manufacture nuclear
weapons. He concludes that Egypt possessed the latent technological
capability in 1969 (and Israel in 1968) . " Zahlan was closer to the
primary sources, so his critical assessment seems more reliable.
In April 1972 Egypt announced a plan to buy two nuclear power
stations of 400 megawatts each. One would come from the USSR for a cost
of $70 million, and the other source was not identified. 12 This plan
did not come to fruition either.
2. Domestic Politics
The issue overriding all others in the period 1971-1973 was how
Sadat would regain the Sxnsi peninsula militarily. In this strategic
9Bhatia, op. cit .
, p 58.
10Zahlan, 1972, op. cit., p 25.
"Meyer, op. cit., p 41.
12John K. Cooley, "Egypt Assessing Nuclear Strength, " Christian Science
Monitor , 2 January 1975, p 1.
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context, nuclear weapons would not become available in the short -run and
were not a credible threat without conventional force parity with the
Israelis. Sadat's new Egyptian Chief of Staff in the May 1971
reorganization was a commander renowned for his professional ability,
Saad El-Shazly. The re-professionalization of the Egyptian Army
continued with Sadat's requests from the Soviets for high- technology
equipment comparable to Israeli military hardware. Sadat decided during
this period to revise Egyptian domestic arms production strategy from
attempted non-aligned self-reliance to integration with western arms
producers for licensed production of selected items. 13 The long-run
parallel of this strategy for the nuclear program was to turn away from
reliance on the uncertain Soviet nuclear guarantee and the restrictive
Soviet nuclear export policy to Western nuclear suppliers. According to
one source, the AEE unofficially requested to buy nuclear reactors from
American companies after Sadat came to power, but the requests were
denied due to the poor Egyptian-US diplomatic relations at the time. 14
In the short -run, Sadat needed the Soviet nuclear umbrella and Soviet
conventional arms.
In January 1972 Sadat declared publicly that Egypt would seek
"retaliatory" offensive weapons from the Russians. 15 The definition of
retaliatory was purposely left vague enough to include conventional jets
or long-range missiles. In March, the decision to develop Egypt's
domestic arms industry was made public. 16 As part of the large Soviet
arms buildup between December 1972 and June 1973, Egypt received a
shipment of SCUD-B surface-to-surface missile launchers capable of
13E1-Sayed Selim, 1984, op. cit., pp 135-140.
14E1-Sayed Selim, 1982, op. cit., p 140.
15William Dullforce, Egypt Asks Russians For 'Retaliatory' Arms," Washington
Post , 26 January 1972, pp 1 , 18.
16
"Sadat Says Egypt Will Produce Arms," Washington Post , 17 March 1972, p 22.
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hitting Israeli population centers from the west bank of the Suez
Canal. 17 In addition to the new missile launchers shipped for Egyptian
units, a Soviet -manned separate detachment of SCUD-B launchers was
operational by August 1973. With the arrival of these missile
launchers, Egypt finally possessed a delivery vehicle capable of
threatening Israeli population centers - the first credible strategic
capability to counter Israel's demonstrated superior air and missile
capability.
3 . Indian Assistance
In September 1973 an IAEA survey reported Egypt's nuclear power
requirements of 400 megawatts capacity by 1980 and 400 megawatts
additional capacity by 1982. 18 (This survey was based upon over-
optimistic cost projections. The IAEA estimated the reactor cost to be
$460 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) , while Egyptian estimates ranged from $225
to $390 per kWh. Later Egyptian estimates in 1983 ranged up to $5000
per KWh. 19 ) In 1973 Egypt requested help from India to build a 50-
megawatt desalination plant. 20 If this is the same required
desalination reactor described in the 1971 IAEA conference documents,
this would have been heavy-water moderated, and may have provided small
but militarily significant quantities of nuclear waste material. The
Indian connection seems to have been potentially the most likely source
for dual-use nuclear technology imports. At that time, India's advanced
indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability and its non-aligned
17Joseph Burmudez, "Egypt's Missile Development," (draft) from William C.
Potter and Harlan W. Jencks , editors, The International Missile Bazaar: The New
Suppliers Network , Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1993 (pending final
publication) pp 28-29. According to Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, (Arms
Transfers to the Third World. 1971-1985
. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19 87)
it is unconfirmed that SCUD-B launchers (12) and missiles (60) were ordered in
1972 and delivered in 1973.
18Nashif, op. cit., p 28.
''Gregory H. Kats, "Egypt, " from Jozef Goldblat editor, Non- Proliferation:
The Why and the Wherefore
. London: Taylor and Francis, 19 85, p 186.
^hatia, op. cit., p 59.
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international political status raise the question of why India did not
share dual -use technology with the Egyptian scientists. India's NPT
non- signatory status included a past official position against exporting
dual -use applications of nuclear technology such as waste
reprocessing. 21 According to Bhatia, the Egyptian request for a 50-
megawatt desalination reactor was withdrawn in 1974, for fear of
jeopardizing initially successful contacts with the US for a much larger
power reactor.
The period from Nasir' s death to the eve of the Yom Kippor War
presents inconclusive evidence for either the weak state hypothesis, the
motivational hypothesis, or the technological hypothesis. This was a
period of transition, in which Sadat probably allowed continuation of
preceding levels of research and development in order not to upset the
fragile regime coalition. What is unanswered in available literature is
the degree of Egyptian scientific links with India at the time when
India was proceeding quickly toward making a peaceful explosion device.
Long historical ties with the Indian program imply a probable
connection. Strong motivational conditions are present in the form of
Arab regional prestige, and loss of a war, but these appear to have been
satisfied by pursuit of conventional weapons capabilities. The Soviet
nuclear guarantee likely provided a strong dissuasive element in Egypt's
motivational profile. The newness of the NPT regime did not restrict
other foreign nuclear suppliers as much as the political isolation of
Egypt under Soviet alliance, which supports Sadat's attempted breaking
out of this isolation by ejecting Soviet advisors in 1972. The Egyptian
representatives at the 19 71 UN/IAEA conference demonstrated some degree
of technical capability in the AEE, but Egypt's foreign technology
dependence was clearly implied in the presentations. The PNE capability
was sought from foreign sources under the guise of the NPT. Together
21Rodney W. Jones, "India," from Jozef Goldblat, editor Non- Proliferation:
The Why and the Wherefore
. London: Taylor and Francis, 1985, pp 101-105.
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with Zahlan's assessment of this period, the technological hypothesis
explains why Egypt had not developed a weapons capacity in this period
of Egypt's nuclear development history.
4 . Public Demand for Weapons
One month after the Yom Kippor War cease-fire, before the
Egyptian and Israeli armies had disengaged from their war- fighting
positions across the Suez Canal, Mohamed Heikal again raised the nuclear
arms issue publicly in his weekly editorials on 24 November and 14
December, 1973. He stated alternately that Israel either possessed
three bombs, or was at least capable of producing them within six
months. Heikal suggested the Arabs must develop a collective weapons
program, and that this subject should be discussed at the upcoming
Algiers Summit. The requirements for an Arab joint program were: (1) an
Arab supervisory committee, (2) one hundred scientists, (3) "some $500
to $750 million" to establish an atomic center somewhere in the
"strategic depth" of the Arab world far away from any Israeli threat,
and (4) access to existing scientific facilities throughout the Arab
world. This is the first public reference to Egypt's attempted nuclear
arms development program prior to 1967, Egypt's attempt to buy nuclear
arms from the Chinese after the June 1967 War and Qadaffi's attempt to
buy nuclear weapons in 1970. 22
Two weeks later after the Algiers Summit had convened, Heikal
again declared the need for a joint Arab nuclear deterrent to Israel.
Either the summit meetings did not result in a plan of action which
suited Heikal 's pro-nuclear stance, or he attempted to bolster the long-
term commitment necessary for developing an advanced technology.
22William Dullforce, "Key Egyptian Urges Arabs to Get or Make Atom Bomb,"
Washington Post , 24 November 1973, pp 1,13.
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I earnestly hope that this subject be taken seriously, and that we
prepare for it, with the foreknowledge that the use of nuclear weapons
is fraught with enormous dangers, but also aware that our struggle
with Israel - despite all that may be said about the upcoming peace
conference - is a long, long, long struggle, and that this struggle
may witness moments of madness that should not catch us by surprise.
Moreover, if the Arab Nation truly aspires to an influential world
role, this it cannot attain without an independent nuclear umbrella.
This has been well understood by both China and France - and I daresay
India and Japan as well, given their preparedness to build the bomb
within months once a political decision has been taken. 23
Heikal was fired from his position as editor of Al-Ahram in early
1974. ^ This is the first indication that Sadat would not adopt the pro-
nuclear weapons policy being advocated by Heikal and Fahmy.
D. RAPPROACHMENT TO THE WEST
1. U.S. Cooperation
Sadat decided to approach the West alone, without Arab funding.
The Egyptian -American nuclear cooperation negotiations lasted four
years, from initial secret contacts in January 1974 to the 1978
Congressional Nonproliferation Act. In the end, US Congressional pro-
Israeli and non-proliferation sentiment and Egyptian negotiation
strategy thwarted a deal which seemed likely at the start. Between
January and June 1974, the American Atomic Energy Commission secretly
negotiated separately with both the Egyptian AEE and the Israeli Atomic
Energy Commission. On 18 May 1974 India successfully tested a peaceful
nuclear explosion. Egyptian scientists may have been present at the
Indian testing grounds during this explosion. 25 If so, this could have
increased the political support for the weapons capability within the
ruling elite surrounding Sadat as well as within the AEE. On 14 June,
President Nixon and President Sadat announced a joint agreement for
^Paul Jabber, Not By War Alone , Berkeley: University of California Press,
1981, p 34; from Al-Ahram , 14 December 1973.
^Jabber, 1981, op. cit., p 34.
^Feldman, op. cit., p 73.
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improved economic and diplomatic relations including agreement to sell
nuclear reactors and fuel (unspecified) to Egypt. This single
initiative, promising access to advanced western technology, is the
watershed event symbolizing Egyptian reentry into western politics.
Although it subsequently failed its ultimate goal, this event symbolized
the western recognition of Egypt's need for assistance for
industrialization, at a point in time when Soviet industrial support
appeared restrictive.
On 27 June Egypt paid a $660,000 down-payment for nuclear fuel
enrichment services to be provided for a future US -supplied power
reactor. The formation of the Arab Energy Institute 11 July, intended
to develop indigenous Arab science programs for nuclear and solar
energy, indicates the symbolic importance which was attached to the
Nixon-Sadat statement of bilateral relations .and complimented the drive
toward Arab nuclear self-sufficiency. 26 US Congressional hearings held
from June through September recommended stringent safeguards for the
proposed 600 -megawatt reactors and 4 percent enriched uranium sales
including clauses that would require all fuel fabrication and waste
reprocessing be performed outside Egypt and Israel, and that both Egypt
and Israel should either sign the NPT immediately or place all its
existing facilities under IAEA safeguards. 27
2. Nonproliferation Posture
Sadat followed a wide-ranging strategy on the issue of
proliferation and Egyptian nuclear development during his most
popularly- supported period immediately after the 1973 war. He attempted
to capitalize on the Egyptian political victory of the war. Egypt and
^enry Tanner, "Arabs to Set Up Energy Institute," New York Times , 12 July
1974, p 50.
^Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and
Movements and on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives, U. S. Foreign Policy and the Export of Nuclear
Technology to the Middle East . June 25; July 9, 18; and September 16, 1974,
Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1974, pp vi-viii.
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Iran sponsored United Nations Resolution 3263 (XXIX) for a Middle East
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) in July and August, in the United
Nations General Assembly. 28 Karem suggests that Egypt decided to
cosponsor the NWFZ proposal to soften US congressional criticism of the
proposed reactor sale to Egypt and Israel . Egypt decided to cosponsor
the resolution only after getting Iran to agree to change the title of
the proposed agenda item from "Establishment of a Nuclear Free Zone" to
"Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, " to permit continued
development of civilian applications of nuclear power. The resolution
did not focus upon Israel's suspected capability. It was approved by a
roll call vote on 9 December, 128 votes for to none against, with Israel
and Burma abstaining. The two key points of the resolution are:
. . .
considers that . . . it is indispensable that all parties
concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and immediately their
intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing,
obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons;
. . . calls upon the parties concerned in the area to accede to the
Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The American congressional opposition to the Nixon- Sadat
initiative led Egypt to continue seek a power reactor from other
sources. Sometime during 1974, Egypt initiated secret talks with
France's Technicatome company to upgrade the Inchas research reactor
from 2 megawatts to 10 megawatts. 29 Alternately, in November 1974,
Egypt's Foreign Minister announced that the Soviets had unofficially
agreed to provide a 4 60 -megawatt power reactor and that the agreement
would be signed during Brezhnev's visit in January 1975. Brezhnev's
visit was postponed and the initial Soviet agreement was not mentioned
again. 30 The Egyptian acceptance of the Soviet nuclear umbrella must
have been communicated to Moscow during the American debate on providing
^Mahmoud Karem, A Nuclear -Weapon -Free Zone in the Middle East: Problems and
Prospects
, New York: Greenwood Press, 1988, pp 91-100, 137-139.
29Bhatia, op. cit., p 60.
"John K. Cooley, "Egypt Assessing Nuclear Strength, " New York Times , 2
January 1975, p 1; also El-Sayed Selim, 1982, op. cit., p 141.
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reactors to Egypt and Israel. In December 1974, the Soviet nuclear
umbrella was reaffirmed by Arab diplomatic sources to protect Syria,
Egypt, Iraq, and Algeria "if it is proved that Israel possesses atomic
weapons" . 31
The attempted use of nuclear power exports to facilitate the
Egyptian- Israeli disengagement accords failed. Sadat responded to
Congressional recommendation for IAEA inspections, with a counter-
proposal that both Israel and Egypt submit all previously built reactors
to IAEA inspection. Whereupon Israel withdrew support for the proposal,
effectively vetoing the Nixon plan. Sadat reacted by recalling the
stalled disengagement negotiations and Israel's possession of nuclear
weapons
.
We shall not be scared or intimidated and if Israel is going to
bring atomic weapons to this area we shall also find a way to having
atomic weapons. But we shall not start and we shall not be the first
to use atomic arms. 32
In January 1975, Egypt conducted negotiations with the French
for two power reactors, with purported Iranian or Saudi financing. 33 On
7 August 1975, following warnings to Israel against introducing nuclear
weapons into the region, Sadat formed the Higher Council for Nuclear
Energy (HCNE)
.
34 HCNE members included Sadat, Vice-president Mubarak,
Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, War Minister Abdel Ghani Gamasi, the
prime minister, minister of electricity, and the chief of the General
Intelligence Agency. Only the electricity minister had some technical
expertise. This was a political body to set national guidance for the
nuclear development project. The council held its first meeting in
3l
"Soviets Said to Give Arabs Atom Pledge, " New York Times , 4 December 1974.
p 14 .
32John W. Finney, "Sale of Reactors to Egypt and Israel is Now in Doubt, " New
York Times , 17 December 1974, pp 1,4; "Mideast Ready to Explode, Sadat Says," New
York Times , 17 December 1974. p 4.
33Nashif, op. cit., p 28.
34
"Egypt," EIU, number 3, 1975, p 5.
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September 1975, affirming the earlier proposals to build the first power
reactor at Sidi-Krier , 35 The HCNE bears striking resemblance to the
Supreme Committee for Armament (SCA) established to supervise the
Egyptian arms industry contribution to the Arab Organization for
Military Industries (AOMI) . The SCA consisted of the President, Vice-
President, War Minister, Foreign Minister, Chief of General Intelligence
Agency, Finance Minister and Minister of State for Military Production.
Although the SCA and the AOMI were separate from the Egyptian and Arab
nuclear development organs, the pattern of reorganization to achieve a
new goal indicates a change in state policy.
By establishing a new ministry in name, Sadat intended to effect
a policy change, from importing western technology on a turn- key basis,
to licensed reproduction of foreign technology, eventually leading to
Egyptian- designed weapons. The formation of the HCNE signals a shift
in Sadat's nuclear development strategy ostensibly for peaceful purposes
only, in August 1975. This shift may only have been a diversification
of nuclear technology suppliers, renewed covert drive for weapons
development, or a reconciliation to peaceful -use -only applications.
In order for Sadat to receive western economic and military aid
he had to convince the Americans that Egypt would not develop nuclear
weapons. In November 1975, continuing negotiations with the Americans
led to a revision in the American conditions which Sadat found
acceptable. These conditions included the old provisions of IAEA
inspection safeguards and obligation to reprocess, fabricate and store
nuclear fuels outside Egypt. The Egyptians dropped the insistence of
applying the Israeli reactor at Dimona to IAEA safeguard inspections,
accepting such safeguards for future reactors only. Egypt would receive
two 600 -megawatt power reactors at a total cost of $1.2 billion.
President Ford requested $750 million for economic aid to Egypt,
35E1-Sayed Selim, 1982, op. cit .
, p 145.
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obliquely related to this request. 36 The following month Sadat
announced a Franco -Egyptian arms development program including export of
French nuclear power plants. 37 This was the first public announcement
of French nuclear assistance to Egypt, made after the US cooperation
agreement had been signed.
3 . Peaceful Applications Only
In February 1976, the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram announced the
plan to build ten nuclear power stations in the next 20 years. The
first of these plants would be built by one of two American firms
bidding on the project at the time, Westinghouse and General Electric.
In March 1976 a new organization was grafted from the AEE specifically
for the purpose of negotiating, purchasing, and operating nuclear power
plants, the Nuclear Power Plants Authority, (NPPA) . The NPPA worked for
the Minister of Electricity, Ahmed Sultan. The AEE and the Board of
Atomic Energy remained functionally separate but in fact were headed by
the same man, Dr. Kamal Effat, responsible to the President. 38 At this
time the Minister of Electricity appears to have gained the upper hand
in the bureaucratic infighting. By 1978 both the Board of Atomic Energy
and the AEE were placed under the Ministry of Electricity. 39 The
Minister of Electricity announced Egypt's nuclear power purchasing
strategy of buying first from the US and then from France and West
Germany in order40 .
There are two ways of interpreting the creation of the NPPA in
March 1976. One is that the AEE, frustrated by lack of regime suport,
36Bernard Gwertzman, "Nuclear Accord With Egypt Seen, " New York Times , 1
November 1975, pp 1,5; El-Sayed Selim, 1982, op. cit., pp 141-142.
37Reuters, "France Will help Egypt Make Arms, " New York Times . 15 December
1. 5, pp 1,6.
38Bhatia, op. cit., p 53; El Sayed Selim, 1982, op. cit., pp 146.
39Bhatia, op. cit., p 53.
40Nashif, op. cit., p 29.
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demonstrated potential to join an anti-regime military coalition, which
led to Sadat to weaken the AEE by placing the NPPA under a separate
ministry. The second is that Sadat realized he would have to cooperate
with western non-proliferation measures in order to obtain western
eocnomic aid. The nuclear export restrictions of the London Nuclear
Suppliers Group, an unofficial nuclear export cartel formed in spring of
1975, must have been made clear in ongoing US -Egyptian negotiations. 41
Egypt turned to Communist China again in April 1976 for economic
and military trade, including arms trade and potential nuclear
technology trade. 42 The Chinese leadership was in transition after
Mao's death and the PRC provided a wide range of potential economic an
military supplies to replace Soviet trade. Chinese nuclear export
policy likely remained unchanged from Mao's time. Sadat did not choose
to exploit this source but rather used its potential to keep his options
open if American support evaporated after the Presidential elections in
November
.
4. Israeli Nuclear Threat
Egyptian officials were not silent on the Egyptian- Israeli
nuclear competition during this period. This may reflect intra-elite
tension for and against developing a nuclear weapons. In May 1976
Foreign Minister Fahmy reiterated the challenge that Egypt would get the
bomb if Israel became an overt nuclear power. The announcement from a
member of the SCA and the HCNE, not the President, suggests increase in
leadership commitment to an Egyptian bomb. A Presidential statement
could be interpreted as rhetorical posturing for foreign or domestic
4IRoger F. Pajak, Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Implications for
the Superpowers
, Washington: National Defense University Press, 1982, pp 21-22;
The original members, the USSR, US, Canada, Japan, Britain, France, and West
Germany were later joined in 1977 by Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
42
"Chinese Meet With Egyptian Seeking Arms," Washington Post , 20 April 1976,
p 12 .
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purposes. Of note in this statement is Fahmy' s reference to Egyptian
scientific capability.
If Israel explodes an atomic device, Egypt will obtain a similar
weapon or manufacture it. We have scientists capable enough to mount
a reaction in this field, and there are no scientific or technological
barriers in our way. 43
On the other hand, this could be seen as a tacit agreement to refrain
from developing nuclear weapons as long as Israel did not demonstrate
its long- suspected weapons capability.
The AEE continued attempts to import weapons technology.
Sometime in 1976 Egypt approached the French firm Technicatome again
with a request to increase the capacity of the research reactor at
Inchas to 10 megawatts, and to build a fuel fabrication plant. The firm
initially responded with a proposal of 50 million francs, quite possibly
within Egypt's budget, but withdrew the offer under pressure from the
French government. 44 A fuel fabrication plant is a more direct
indication of capability to build a nuclear bomb. This indicates the
competing interests to acquire weapons technologies during public
overtures of non-proliferation compliance.
Information of the Egyptian strategic chemical weapons
capability was reported less than six weeks later. 45 According to this
report, Egypt possessed a strategic chemical weapons capability as early
as before the 1973 War. The capability was described as nerve gas
deliverable by either SCUD-B missile or by aircraft. At least one such
operational air force unit was so equipped, but never deployed during
the war, possibly reserved as a strategic deterrent. War Minister
Gamasi confirmed this on 14 October 1976, declaring "Egypt has enough of
43
"Egypt to Get A-Bomb if Israel Explodes One," Washington Post , 1 May 1976,
p A9 .
""Bhatia, op. cit., pp 60-61.
45William Beecher, "Egypt Seen Set to Use Nerve Gas, " Washington Post , 6 June
1976, p A14.
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the other types of weapons of mass extermination and it has the
capability of retaliating against an Israeli nuclear blow by making use
of these weapons". 4* Sadat's possession of a chemical counter-value
deterrent in 1973 did not preclude his subsequent continued pursuit of
nuclear technologies with both civilian and military potential.
5. Civilian Uses
The ongoing negotiations with the US led to Egyptian and Israeli
approval of an interim cooperation agreement 4 and 5 August 1976,
pursuant to a final agreement in 1978. The Egyptian proposal was for
two reactors of 12 80 megawatts capacity and the Israeli proposal for two
reactors of 1970 megawatts. The agreement was not yet readied for
approval by President Ford or the Congress. 47 An Egyptian letter of
intent was submitted to Westinghouse for the first 600 megawatt reactor
at Sidi Krier. 48 El-Sayed Selim suggests that the negotiations were
delayed by US elections. No further official US action was taken until
mid- 1979. The US refused to go further than preliminary coordination
and planning because Egypt refused to ratify the NPT.
It was reported in April 1977 that Egyptian scientists were
being trained at India's Trombay research center. 49 At Trombay,
Egyptian scientists could have received training in chemical waste
reprocessing. In June 1977, after President Carter announced a more
restrictive non-proliferation policy reversing the liberal Nixon- Ford
export policy, Sadat announced Egypt's plan to buy four or five power
reactors from France. In the interview Sadat implied that the Egyptian
^Shikaki, op. cit., p 86.
47
"Egypt, Israel Agree to Buy Atomic Reactors from U.S.," Washington Post ,
6 August 1976, p A8 ; "U.S. Initials Reactor Pacts with Egypt and Israelis," New
York Times , 6 August 1976, p D12
.
^Bhatia, op. cit., p 60; El-Sayed Selim, 1982, op. cit., p 142.
49Jabber, 1979, op. cit., p 78.
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agreement for two reactors from Westinghouse remained in effect. 50 The
Egyptian organizational structure was again revised in 1977. The AEE's
geology department was split off to form the Nuclear Materials
Corporation (NMC) . The NMC was attached to the Ministry of Trade and
remained responsible for geological surveying and nuclear resources
Lon. 51
The AEE published its long-range electricity generation plan at
the May 1977 international conference hosted by the IAEA. The plan
assumed that a 600 -megawatt power plant would prove cheaper than oil-
fueled electricity plants after four and a half years operation, and
would recover the entire initial investment within ten years of
operation. The plan is summarized in Table 8 below. 52













What is unusual about this long-range projection is the inexperience of
AEE scientists in running a single large power reactor, at the time of
the forecast. This implied a significant surge in the number of
scientists and technicians undergoing training. It may also have been
Year
Operational Site
1983 Sidi Krier, Unit 1
1985 Sidi Krier, Unit 2
1989 Upper Egypt Zone
1990 El Arish, Unit 1
1991 El Arish, Unit 2
1993 Cairo Zone, Qattara
1995 Cairo Zone
1997 Upper Egypt Zone
1999 Cairo Zone
Total
^"Egypt to Buy French Reactors," Christian Science Monitor , 20 June 1977,
p 2.
51E1-Sayed Selim, 1982, op. cit., p 146; Bhatia, op. cit., p 53.
52E1-Sayed Selim, op. cit., pp 139-141, taken from K. W. Effat et al,
"Projected Role of Nuclear Power in Egypt and Problems Encountered in
Implementing the First Nuclear Power Plant, " in Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle ,
volume 6, Vienna: IAEA, 1977.
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designed to create an indigenous fuel cycle capability, with military-
applications .
Egypt's nuclear disadvantage was understood by both President
Sadat and Foreign Minister Fahmy throughout the two-year Egyptian-
Israeli peace negotiations. Fahmy had demanded full Israeli accession
to the NPT as a precondition for peace earlier, in October 19 75, January
1976 and April 1976. Sadat repeated the demand in an American
television interview 27 February 1977. 53 The Egyptian demand
resurfaced in the context of the peace negotiations in the American
press in December 1977 and November 1978. 54 Fahmy, a nuclear weapons
advocate, resigned after Sadat signed the final peace treaty in 1979.
Negotiating from a position of nuclear inferiority may have been his
reason, not the idea of peace. Sadat was unable to link Israel's
nuclear potential to the final agreement. This is the second indication
of Sadat's acceptance of the proliferation status quo versus Israel -
Egypt's non-proliferation position.
6. Bureaucratic Decline of the Atomic Energy Establishment
An example of Sadat's exclusion of scientific advice from
decision-making in nuclear matters is the 1978 decision to store
Austrian nuclear waste in the Egyptian Eastern Desert, allowing Austria
full control of the nuclear waste including the right to withdraw it.
According to El-Sayed Selim, the AEE was never consulted in this
decision. 55 Perhaps this is the result of diminishing the autonomous
character of the AEE by placing it within the Ministry of Electricity.
The AEE leadership remained under the direction of a scientists since
1970. However the NPPA was headed by a civil engineer. The NMC was
headed by a geologist. The dispersion of responsibilities between three
53Feldman, op. cit., p 67.
54Perlmutter, Handel and Bar- Joseph, op. cit., p 35
55E1-Sayed Selim, 1982, op. cit., p 147.
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organizations does not necessarily signify a diffusion of effort.
Funding budgets for these three organizations, if available, might
indicate the relative import and size of each organization.
According to official statements in January 1977, the AEE budget
was 585,000 Egyptian pounds (less than $850,000) . This was 18 percent
of the total budget of the Ministry of Scientific Research and Atomic
Energy. Table 9 summarizes this 1977 budget.
TABLE 9. 1977 RESEARCH PROJECT BUDGET,
MINISTRY OF STATE FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND ATOMIC ENERGY
(in thousands of Egyptian pounds) 56
Office of Minister 100
Academy of Science and Technology 1555
National Research Centre 79
Projects of Research Institutes 270
Atomic Energy Agency 585
Nuclear Energy and Desalination (25)
Geophysical Exploration for Fissile Materials (100)
Programmes of the Atomic Energy Centre (Inchas) (300)
Programmes of the Radiation National Research Centre (150)
Programmes of the General Secretariat (10)
Compared with the AEE budgets in the period 1961-1967, this is a
significant decrease in government support. This does not include the
NPPA budget, under the Ministry of Electricity. 57 The NMC budget was
probably taken from the above budget summary. Insufficient government
support for atomic research forced many Egyptian atomic scientists to
leave the research field and teach in Arab universities. The Minister
of Electricity appealed to immigrant Egyptian nuclear scientists to
return to Egypt, but few had returned as of 1981. (According to one
study in 1980, 60 percent of Arab researchers worked outside the Arab
56Zahlan, 1980, op. cit., pp 83-84.
57The Electricity Ministry production budget was 18.5 million Egyptian pounds
in budget year 1961/1962. Referring to Table 3, the Electricity sector received
four to five times as much investment as scientific research from 1962-1964.
Corresponding data is not available for the period after 1970.
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states. 58 ) An AEE official assessed the Egyptian nuclear program in the
1970s as follows:
Egypt's scientific base, which has been evolving over the last
twenty years, has not been successful in developing and integrating
the required specializations. It does not have the capability to
implement a self-reliant national program for nuclear energy.
Further, the present scientific base has not been fully utilized yet.
As a result of the recession of the scientific activities of the
Egyptian corporations operating in the nuclear field, growing numbers
of experts have emigrated to national universities and Arab
One example of this emigration pattern is Iraq' s recruitment in 1975 of
Yihya al-Meshad, Dean of Alexandria University Faculty of Nuclear
Sciences and Nuclear Reactors, to head the Iraqi nuclear program. 60
(Egypt continued its scientific connection with India throughout
the 1970s. Cairo Radio announced an Egyptian- India agreement for
"peaceful applications of nuclear energy," in January 1978. 61 What is
not known is the level of technology transferred.)
7. Economic Defense Burden
What do Egyptian military expenditures from 1970 to 1979
indicate about both leadership commitment to go to war and opportunity
cost of nuclear weapons development? The Egyptian Israeli peace treaty
signed in May 1979 should have lessened hawkish Egyptians security and
international prestige incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Granted
the Sinai Peninsula would not completely return to Egyptian control
until April 1982, but the treaty raised Egyptian prestige with the West
arguably to political parity with Israel. If Sadat had been undertaking
a secret weapons program prior to this time, to regain Egyptian pride
and Egyptian territory, the peace treaty fulfilled both of those needs
58Hafez Kobeissi, "Geographic Distribution of Arab Researchers," from A. B
Zahlan, editor, The Arab Brain Drain , London: Ithaca Press, 1981, p 143.
59E1-Sayed Selim, 1982, op. cit., p 153.
^Feldman, op. cit., p 74.
61Feldman, op. cit., p 73.
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with the added bonus of large Western economic and military aid. 62
Egyptian defense expenditures are directly related to perceived security
threats and should decline when the leadership perception of security
threat has changed. When additional conventional military capability
begins to cost more than a nuclear weapons capability, a rational -actor
would invest in the nuclear program without retarding conventional force
capability. Table 9 summarizes Egyptian conventional force defense
burden from 1970 to 1979 and gross domestic investment. Gross domestic
investment represents government and private capital investment,
excluding government outlays for construction and military durable
goods. This approximates the maximum that state and private investors
allocated to non-military projects, such as mineral exploration or
building new factories. For comparison, the previously cited optimistic
1973 IAEA market survey estimated building a 700 megawatt reactor in
five and a half years for $276 million. 63 Other estimates for a base
case weapons program (one small bomb per year) are on the order of $200
million over six years, in 1980 dollars. 64
62Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, "U. S. Arms Transfer and Arms
Control Policies: The Middle East," from Steven L. Spiegel, Mark A. Heller, and
Jacob Goldberg editors, The Soviet -American Competition in the Middle East ,
Lexington Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1988, p 28. Military-
assistance deliveries from the Us to Egypt rose from nothing between 1968 and
1973 to $1.2 million (1976), $20.2 million (1977), $91.7 million (1978) and $283
million (1979) .
63Kats, op. cit., p 186.
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TABLE 10. CONVENTIONAL FORCES DEFENSE BURDEN
(in millions of dollars)
Year Gross Domestic Military
Investment" Expenditures 66
(base 1975) (base 1976/1981)
1970 1,531 943
1971 1,343 982
1972 1,384 1,197 / 2,423 E
1973 1,997 1,261 / 4,180 E
1974 2,422 1,286 / 4,600 E
1975 3,818 1,056 / 4,447 E
1976 3,273 1,335 / 3,789 E
1977 2,858 1,154 / 4,062 E
1978 2,783 2,978 E
1979 3,056 2,435 E
1980 3,121 2,492 E
E = estimated
The gross domestic investment data give a very broad sketch of
Sadat's ability to invest in nuclear infrastructure. The military-
expenditure per cent of GNP figures show a surge in spending from 1973
to 1977. These data support the contention that if Sadat had access to
the advanced technology between 1974 and 1977, he could have supported a
six-year, $200 million nuclear development project. Without that
western technical guidance, the regime was not sure that the project
could be completed.
The period from the Yom Kippor War to the 1979 Egyptian- Israeli
Peace treaty exhibits information to support both the weak state and the
motivational hypotheses. Evidence to support the weak state hypothesis
includes Sadat's creation of the HCNE following a tough pro-nuclear
weapons speech, possibly coopting the nuclear "hawks" and distancing the
AEE from the regime elites. By firing Heikal soon after a strong public
rationale for weapons, Sadat removed a potential political
mobilizational tool from the pro-weapons advocates. (This could have
65World Tables, 19 83 , Volume I, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1983, p 52.
^orld Military Expenditures and Arms Trade (WMEAT) , 19 68-19 77 , Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979, p
41; and WMEAT, 1972-1982 . ACDA, Washington D C: USGPO, 1984, p 24.
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been justified to Heikal's supporters by invoking state secrecy laws as
well.) Sadat further weakened a possible threat from the AEE by
creating the NPPA and the NMC from the AEE as rival organizations,
reporting to separate ministries (electricity and trade respectively)
.
The further reorganization of the AEE under the ministry of scientific
research in 1976 and again under the ministry of electricity in 1978
shows what a political football the AEE had become by this time. The
AEE budget in 1977 compared with the years 1961-1965, is much smaller
in relation to total science ministry budget as well as the greater
national budget. This declining government support is shown by the
emigration of scientists from the research field to teaching or foreign
positions
.
The motivational hypothesis is supported by separate Arab
leaders' acknowledgement of the Israeli nuclear capability and
development of an Egyptian strategic chemical missile deterrent. Also,
the reported defense burden of 30-35 percent of GNP from 1973-1975
supports the argument for nuclear weapons as cost effective. London
Nuclear Supplier cartel restrictions presents a strongly dissuasive
condition from the motivational hypothesis. The global criticism of
India after the PNE demonstration in 1974 and Egypt's peaceful
reputation from yearly sponsorship of an NWFZ resolution beginning in
1974 have an immeasurable dissuasive effect on the regime.
8. Public Opposition
From 1979 to 1981 the subject of nuclear power was openly
criticized for the first time in Egypt. The government's grand
announcements prior to this time were not taken seriously by those
Egyptian elites concerned with the costs and hazards of nuclear power
reactors. The debate centered on six issues: (1) low levels of
electricity demand did not justify nuclear power, (2) possible radiation
exposure, (3) disposal of radioactive waste, (4) building nuclear power
plants too close to large urban centers, (5) furtherance of economic
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dependency on the west, and (6) danger of Israeli attacks similar to the
destruction of the Iraqi reactor. 67 This type of public debate could
not have occurred prior to the trend in political liberalization after
1973. That it did not occur until after the Egyptian- Israeli peace
agreement may signify that the Egyptian elite did not take Sadat's
initiatives seriously until after his peace initiative yielded results
two years later.
The proliferation-nonproliferation dichotomy of the Egyptian
position towards foreign nuclear exporters is a repeated pattern
throughout the period 1975 to 1980. Again in 1979, during the
negotiations on the American nuclear cooperation agreement, the talks
were suspended after the Egyptians proposed that American safeguards be
cancelled in the event of a new war in the region. 68 Perhaps Sadat
allowed this Egyptian nuclear hawk faction to express itself even after
the peace treaty, in order to extract nuclear guarantees from the US.
That he allowed it to continue to exist at all, indicates the possible
strength of the pro -nuclear weapons movement inside Egypt even after
Heikal was fired and Fahmy had resigned.
In May 19 80, Cairo announced the discovery of mineral deposits
containing 5,000 tons of uranium and the establishment of a the largest
uranium extraction factory in the region, with help from Canada. 69 In
July 19 80, the Egyptian HCNE declared that the nuclear program was "of
vital importance". 70 In September 1980, the new AEE director-general,
Dr. Ibrahim Hamouda, gave the following response regarding Israel's
suspected nuclear weapons potential
:
67El-sayed Selim, 1982, op. cit., pp 147-152
^Bhatia, op. cit., p 60.




As long as a certain state does not make a nuclear test, it cannot
be said with certainty that it possesses such a weapon. It is
possible to evaluate and assume, but we cannot give a definite answer
without proof.
Such an ambiguous response by the head of the Egyptian agency
responsible for such activities may indicate that Egypt is not seriously
pursuing military applications. 71 Alternatively, this statement
carefully satisfies both the nuclear hawks as well as the opponents of
nuclear power.
Egypt's sponsorship of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposal in
the General Assembly yielded success in the sixth year. The Middle East
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Resolution 35/14 7 was approved by the UN
General Assembly unanimously on 12 December 1980. This was seen as a
tremendous breakthrough. The resolution had been approved, slightly
modified, in every year from 1974 to 1979, with Israel registering
opposition by either abstaining or voting against it. In October 1980
Israel proposed its own version of the resolution and a compromise was
reached with the Arab states omitting references to the Egyptian- Israeli
peace treaty. This led directly to the Egyptian ratification of the NPT
two months later on 22 February 1981. 72 By acceding to the NPT, Sadat
had removed the most significant reason holding back the London
Suppliers Group from exporting nuclear power plants to Egypt.
9. Sadat's Nuclear Epithet
Sadat used the nuclear weapons debate for political purposes to
keep his domestic rivals off-guard. During the period 1973 to 1975,
Egypt was most strongly motivated to get nuclear weapons by indigenous
development. High defense budgets made nuclear weapons more cost
effective, foreign (French) suppliers appeared willing to provide the
technology, the conventional military establishment was perceived to be
highly professional (not as politically threatening after Sadat
71Bar- Joseph, op. cit .
, p 223.
72Karem, op. cit., pp 92-109.
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reassigned the Chief of Staff as Ambassador to Britain) and almost at
the quality of operational parity versus Israel, and the Indian
scientific cooperation agreement continued during this period. Yet
Sadat's desire for western (American) support required that he subdue
the AEE and so he created the HCNE, and then reorganized the AEE to form
the NPPA and the NMC in order to keep the AEE from developing the
technology independently and threatening the American gambit.
Estimates of Egypt's technological capabilities by 1981 vary.
Egypt's nuclear -technology capability did not mature beyond basic
science research to useful applications of that know-how. Sadat
redirected the Egyptian nuclear development program from sole reliance
on the Soviets to attempted diversification between Western and non-
aligned nuclear exporters such as Canada and India. However, the
program continued the previous restrictive trends of importing nuclear
technology on a "turn-key" basis (dependent on foreign technicians for
design and construction) and continued to be entirely financed and
directed by government agencies. The long-range plans for 6,600
megawatts of electric power generation by the year 2 000, appear overly
sophisticated or over-optimistic, according to El-Sayed Selim. 73
According to one report, Egypt possessed a mature nuclear
infrastructure in basic science by the time of Sadat's assassination.
Over 500 scientists and technicians were employed at the Nuclear
Research Centre in Inchas and at the AEE in Cairo.
Egypt ranks as one of the scientifically most advanced states in
the Arab world. . . . Egyptians are active in international scientific
forums and some hold senior position in the IAEA in Vienna. While
Egypt has the technological potential to become a nuclear power, it
lacks the equipment and resources to implement a sustained nuclear
program. 74
73E1-Sayed Selim, 1982, op. cit .
,
p 144
74Pajak, op. cit., pp 42-44.
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The weak state model explanation of the eleven years of Sadat's
rule gives a partially satisfying explanation for the non-event. The
period of highest motivation to develop nuclear weapons is the same
period when an additional layer of non- technical elites was created to
supervise the civilian and military nuclear development program, the
Higher Council for Nuclear Energy (1975) . The HCNE in turn over three
years divided the Atomic Energy Establishment into three agencies under
three separate ministries, the AEE, the Nuclear Power Plants Authority
(NPPA) , and the Nuclear Materials Corporation (NMC) . Whether this was
done to retard the weapons program to a non- threatening pace
controllable by Sadat or whether it was done to increase the efficiency
of the national effort, it effectively weakened the AEE, which had
originally included both functions of civilian power applications and
raw materials exploration. Foreign Minister Fahmy' s support for the
weapons applications throughout this period indicates the tension within
the regime elites for and against a project begun twenty years
previously by the leader of the anti- imperialist revolution.
94
IV. ANALYSIS
Any weak state, regardless of its motivational disposition and level
of scientific advancement, will view a nuclear weapons development
project in terms of domestic security as well as international security.
If the leader can insulate the scientific community from domestic
politics, he may risk supporting the program. Nasir and Sadat
repeatedly attempted to insulate their scientific communities from the
regime elites. When they each perceived a threat of a new group
mobilizing to overthrow the government, they purposely isolated and
weakened the atomic development project. If the weak state leader can
successfully isolate the scientific community from domestic politics, he
will support the program consistently. This type of project required
decade -long leadership support for success in past cases of developing
states which acquired the bomb, such as India and Israel.
A. MOTIVATIONAL CONDITION
Egypt was increasingly motivated to develop nuclear weapons
throughout this study period, for varying reasons. The Egyptian army's
defeat in the 1948 Palestine War is the genesis of the Egyptian- Israeli
arms race which continued unabated for thirty- three years. Nasir came
to power in 1952 largely as a result of that defeat. The spring of 1955
saw the creation of new international security and prestige motivations
for Egypt to acquire a future capacity to build nuclear weapons. The
Israeli attack on Gaza demanded an Arab conventional force response.
Nehru's advice to Nasir, that nuclear technology was a good hedge
against international coercion and a source of economic modernization,
motivated Nasir to support a nuclear science program. Cabinet secretary
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Rahman was strategically placed to favorably influence any elite debate
regarding the potential for nuclear weapons. Nasir emerged from the
1956 war vindicated and not threatened by Israel's apparent military
superiority.
The December 1960 discovery of Israel's secret reactor, created
additional Arab regional pressure upon Egypt to develop a competitive
nuclear science capability. The international community allowed nuclear
exports to go on relatively unrestrained at that time, except by the
state's ability to pay for them. These pressures were relieved by
presidential statements that Egypt would protect the Arab world and
signs of progress in research and development (a research reactor and an
active foreign training program) . Salah Hedayat was a nuclear weapons
policy advocate within the regime elite in the period 1961 to 1963.
Mohamed Heikal took over the role of influential strategic policy expert
favoring nuclear weapons after 1965. Egypt's motivational profile does
not explain the decision to go public in the fall of 1965 with Israel's
ability to produce weapons in three years. Only the dissuasive factor
of domestic bureaucratic competition can explain the timing of the
direct request for Soviet nuclear weapons technology in December 1965.
There was no significant change in Egypt's external security threat or
international prestige at that time.
Egypt's loss of the 1967 war provides strong motive conditions -
overwhelming conventional security threat, low defense establishment
morale, loss in credibility with a nuclear weapons ally, an adversary
with a latent nuclear weapons capacity, and delayed domestic turmoil
against the regime, after the corrective responses appeared inadequate.
Together with these proliferation motives, dissuasive factors included
the economic opportunity costs of heavily investing in the AEE,
categorized below as domestic politics. The quest for military
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superiority ceases to be a factor after 1967, until Egypt had developed
conventional military parity, so the dissuasive factor of strategic
credibility enters in to the equation after 1967.
After the regime consolidation in May 1971, overwhelming Israeli
conventional military advantage together with loss of a war appear to be
the primary motive elements for all Egyptian foreign policy. From 1971
to 1981 a group within the regime elites voiced its preference for
developing nuclear weapons. Military leadership of the Arab
confrontation states and Israel's suspected nuclear capability forced
Egypt to develop a political answer to the nuclear threat. That answer
was alternately to deny its existence or to admit the threat and claim
that Egyptian chemical missiles provided the strategic deterrent. The
electricity demand for a large power reactor was justified to the IAEA
during international conferences on the subject in 1971 and again in
1977. The industrial demand appeared to justify the need for at least
one large power reactor, if not six. Low military morale was a strong
motive only until the Egyptian army proved its quality during the 1973
war. Afterwards, the military would not have seen the need to have an
atom bomb to prove itself a threat to Israel. By the same token, the
dissuasive condition of a strategic credibility gap disappeared after
the Egyptian military displayed its relative parity in conventional
military terms. The higher defense burdens of the 1970s indicate a
strong supporting motive for acquiring a nuclear weapon. Also the
interruption in foreign patronage between Soviet and American support
from 1972 to 1977, deprived Egypt of its' nuclear bomb insurance against
Israel's suspected capability. The Indian explosion in May 1974 gave an
appearance of global spread to third world states which so alarmed the
western european nuclear exporters that they formed a cartel to limit
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nuclear technology exports. Egyptian scientists must have seen this
event as an example to emulate
.
The strongest dissuasive factors of Egypt's nuclear motivational
profile occurred during the period 1965-1975 are the alliance with a
nuclear superpower and the actions taken by both superpowers to prevent
Egypt from competing in the regional nuclear rivalry with the same
technological assist as Israel had received from the US and the French.
The political economic sanctions were a result of that global
competition for influence in the middle east. The Egyptian bureaucratic
competition is evident between the AEE and the DCA from the period 1965-
1971 and again after 1976 with the elevation of the NPPA and the NMC as
separate organizations. The domestic politics dissuasive factor is most
obvious in the period 1964-1965 and again in 1974-1975. During these
two periods, the regime changed the supervisory structure over the AEE,
and removed pro-nuclear weapons advocates from threatening positions of
political power.
Table 11 summarizes the motivational conditions for nuclear
proliferation in Egypt over this period. The politically dynamic nature
of nuclear motives is clear. No one motive or dissuasive condition can
be described as dominating the others. Also it is difficult to weigh
the relative value of motive elements and dissuasive factors at any
point in time. The motivational model confirms the presence of a strong
motive to acquire nuclear weapons under both Nasir and Sadat. It does
not explaining Egypt's nonproliferation. It clearly enumerates the
differing types of motives, but does not resolve the result. One must
conclude that dissuasive factors outweighed motives by default, using
only the motivational model. That does not explain Nasir' s direct
approaches to buy weapons in 1965 and 1967.
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However, this method is useful in presenting the ebb and flow over
time, of political motives for and against acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Both Nasir and Sadat experienced strong valid justifications for
consistently supporting a nuclear development program, during the
periods 1961-1970 and 1971-1977 respectively. Yet they did not. Their
support was inconsistent at best, the outcome of their struggle to
remain in control of a regime which faced multiple domestic political
threats from the army and the party during these periods. Both Nasir
and Sadat were strongly pressured to go nuclear, by the same conditions
which swayed powerful regime elites to voice their stand in favor of
going nuclear (Heikal and Fahmy)
.












7 Low Military Morale
8 High Defense Burden
9 Loss in Credibility
of Nuclear Ally
10. Global Proliferation Trend
11. Political Elite Proponent
1955 1961 1965 1967 1971 1974 1979
Dissuasive Factor
a. Nuclear Ally Guarantee Z Z Z
b. Global Power Preemptive
Intervention Z Z
c. Rival with Latent
Capacity Z Z Z Z Z
d. Domestic Politics Z Z Z
e. Strategic Credibility Gap Z Z
f. Economic/Political Sanctions Z Z Z Z
k. Public Opinion Z
1 . Domestic Bureaucratic
Competition Z Z Z Z
1955 1961 1965 1967 1971 1974 1979
X = Motive Element Present; Z = Dissuasive Factor Present
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B. WEAK STATE EVIDENCE OF THE NON-EVENT
The Egyptian regime's handling of the nuclear development agencies
fits an established pattern of undermining state agencies to preserve
the state. The dilemma of weak states is that they must mobilize state
agencies in order to face genuine domestic or international threats, yet
these very same agencies threaten the regime when they become too
strong. 1 Nasir first eliminated all opposition within the military and
built up a military support base under his loyal friend, Marshal Amer.
After seeing the Syrian military coup in 1961, Nasir attempted to
control the army under a five-man council. Failing that, Nasir
reorganized the mass party, the Arab Socialist Union, as a means of
solidifying his regime apart from the army. When the ASU challenged the
army in 1965, the ASU in turn became a threat to the regime. Nasir used
the army to neutralize the ASU power center during the High Committee
for the Liquidation of Feudalism investigation. Sadat faced the same
challenges to his leadership from the army and the ASU. He fired army
leaders who threatened to become too popular (El-Shazly) . He permitted
opposition political parties to the ASU and then banned them when they
demanded true reforms (New Wafd Party, 1978) .
Both Nasir and Sadat used this pattern in their handling of the
nuclear development agencies. Scientists initiated the atomic energy
program and Nasir appointed a Free Officer to head the national policy-
making Board of Atomic Energy. When the scientist Rahman opposed
Nasir' s unrealistic scientific development plan, Nasir fired him and
left a much politically weaker scientist in charge for two years.
Hedayat appeared to be the ideal politically reliable, scientist-leader,
but his rapid organizational expansion, and his connection with Free
Officer elites posed a threat to Nasir. Within a year after sacking
'Migdal, op. cit., p 208.
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Hedayat and coopting him as special science advisor, Nasir requested the
technology directly from the Soviets. During this time the AEE was
first reassigned under one Free Officer and then under Marshal Amer.
Sadat's handling of the AEE is only slightly different. He began by
replacing AEE leaders whom he distrusted and then split the agency into
separate units. He presided over a period of disagreement over Egyptian
nuclear development between regime elites. First before the 1971 coup,
he appointed a loyalist to supervise the organization. He retired
Hedayat without a sinecure in 1974 after a Libyan -sponsored attempt to
overthrow Sadat. Then when the opportunity for foreign assistance from
the west improved in 1975, Sadat invoked the danger of the Israeli
threat and created the Higher Council for Nuclear Energy for national
policy guidance. This is the same year when the previous AEE director-
general, a credible scientist with overseas education, was prematurely
retired after sixteen years in the AEE. Sadat did not attempt to
directly buy the nuclear technology as did Nasir, (perhaps he did not
want nuclear weapons as badly as Nasir did) . However Sadat fired pro-
nuclear advocates for political reasons, and created competing state
agencies in the form of the NPPA (1976) and the NMC (1977) . These acts
weakened the very institutions organized to acquire the technology for
both military and civilian purposes. From 1974-1976 Egypt sponsored
United Nations resolutions banning nuclear weapons from the middle east
and attempted to buy waste -reprocessing technology from the French.
Finally Sadat possessed no nuclear guarantee during the five year
transition from Soviet client to American client, especially apparent
after congressional pressure halted the Nixon reactor sale initiative in




The weak state model accounts for the interrelationship of domestic
security and international security priorities which frame the decision
to go nuclear. Nasir appears to have chosen to go nuclear at different
times during his regime, when domestic political priorities coincided
with international security demands. Sometime in the first half of
19 61, after the Israeli Dimona reactor was made public, Nasir enjoyed
strong army support and strong pan-Arab support. Later in 1965 the army
and the ASU were both a significant threat to challenge the regime's
authority. From 1965 to his death in 1970, Nasir' s control of the
regime was the weakest, and increasing numbers of dissidents were
imprisoned. The AEE was secondary to the significant threats to the
regime. The AEE as an institution became one small part of the entire
bureaucracy which could not enforce government policy decisions upon the
society. It was not singled out any more than other state agencies.
Beginning in June 1956, Nasir reshuffled the government cabinets
twelve times within fourteen years. 2 Nasir reorganized his government
cabinet whenever popular unrest demanded a change at the top of the
regime, or whenever he felt threatened by a faction within the ruling
elite. Five of those government reorganizations occurred from October
1965 to October 1968, signifying Nasir' s weakness before and after the
1967 war. Comparatively speaking, the AEE leadership changes were
relatively few, only five (six including Amer) from 1955 to 1968.
Sadat learned from Nasir' s failures and did not attempt to buy
weapons directly. The domestic and international security priorities
appear to support a nuclear weapons program from 1971 to 1977. The army
became less of a domestic threat to Sadat after he created a separate
internal security force and coopted army leaders or fired them. Sadat
weakened the ASU party ideologically and structurally. The regime
2Dekmejian, op. cit., p 208.
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reversed Nasir's economic isolation from western businesses. Egypt's
nuclear guarantee was seriously undermined by the Soviet manner of
execution during the superpower nuclear alert in the last days of the
Yom Kippor War. Contrary to later Egyptian claims, chemical weapons did
not satisfy strategic deterrence demands versus Israel's potential
nuclear weapons, if the Egyptian chemical air delivery unit was not
deployed for use during the war. Sadat's repression of Islamic
protests, military academy uprisings, student protests, and urban
workers protests evidence his vulnerability to any group which could
mobilize opposition to the regime. This vulnerability explains his
demotions of General El-Shazly and Heikal in 1974, as well as his early
retirement of AEE chief El Guibaily in 1973 and reorganization of the
atomic energy program under three separate ministries from 1975 to 1977.
All of the primary sources of this study, El-Sayed Selim, Moore, and
Bhatia provide only sketchy glimpses of the institutional instability of
the Egyptian atomic development program during this period. The
following chart is a summary of this evolving institution, including the
names of the chairmen of the Board of Atomic Energy and the Director
-
General of the AEE.
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TABLE 12 EGYPTIAN SCIENTIFIC AND ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATIONS
Year Organization
19 52 Research Council
1953 National Research Institute
(subsumed Research Council)
1955 Board of Atomic Energy (AEB)
1955 Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE)
1956 Science Council (Rahman)
1956 National Research Centre
1959






19 64 Council for Promotion of Scientific Research None





19 65 AEB/AEE Subordinated to Marshal Amer
El
19 65 Supreme Council for Scientific Research Sait* Guibaily
[Deputy Prime Minister]
1965- Design Consultants Association
1974 (Salah Hedayat)
1967
1968 Ministry of Scientific Research




1974 of Scientific Cooperation (Hedayat) [Minister of Education]
1971 National Academy of Science and Technology
(replaced Ministry of Scientific Research)
1973- Board of Atomic Energy attached to El Azm Unknown
1976 National Academy of Science and Technology
(El Guibaily appointed Minister of State for Scientific Research)
1975 Higher Council for Nuclear Energy
1976 Nuclear Power Plants Authority
(Under Ministry of Electricity)
1976 Ministry of Scientific Research Effat Effat
(Subsumed Board of Atomic Energy/AEE)
1977 Nuclear Materials Corporation
(Under Ministry of Trade)
1978 Board of Atomic Energy Attached to
Ministry of Electricity
1979 Higher Council for Energy
1980 Hamouda Hamouda
* = Free Officer
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C. UTILITY OF THE WEAK STATE MODEL
This model does not analyze the technological capability of Egypt to
go nuclear. Rather it assumes that Egypt could have developed that
technology by 1970 given its initial science base in 1952, with the
limited foreign assistance available. 3 Only by access to state secrets
could that assumption be properly evaluated. Moore and Zahlan did not
have that access but believe that Egyptian scientists have been
politically neutered from developing any original scientific research.
Judging by the number of prominent Egyptian scientists in the Libyan and
Iraqi nuclear development projects, the Egyptian scientists were
constrained by the political environment inside Egypt, not by some
cultural bias against developing modern ideas.
However this does not discount the utility of the weak state model.
Arms acquisitions are a political decision, just as land reform or state
education. Domestic politics determines how rapidly a developing state
will acquire advanced technologies. Technological capabilities are a
necessary condition for nuclear proliferation.
Some questions which would be useful for further analysis of Egypt's
case include: what was the level of government funding of both the AEE
and the DCA from 1966 to 1972, where did Egyptian scientists train under
the Indian -Egyptian nuclear cooperation from 1957 to 1974, who among the
regime elites supported the Soviet offer for a power reactor in January
1971? Also, where how did El Guibaily employ foreign- trained scientists
upon their return to Egypt? Did Egyptian scientists working for DCA
have access to Pakistani research? These questions and others would
more closely measure Egypt's technical capability to produce a power
reactor and to make nuclear weapons.
3Stephen Meyer estimates that Egypt possessed the technological capacity to
develop nuclear weapons by 1969 in Meyer op. cit., p 41.
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V. CONCLUSION
A. APPLICATION TO OTHER POTENTIAL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES
Egypt's case is not a historical aberration. All of the first six
states to openly demonstrate their nuclear capability were strong states
during the period in which they developed the technology. The weak
state model has some explanatory value for the restraints in the process
of nuclear nonproliferation. What does this weak- state explanation of
Egypt's case imply for other states? Successful development of nuclear
weapons requires not only sufficient intentions and sufficient technical
capability, but also domestic political strength. State strength is not
obvious to outside observers. The state's ability to extract resources
and execute policies which require societal compliance need only be
strong enough to overcome society's strategies to survive outside the
state rules. State institutions are strong in relation to the degree of
societal cohesion.
According to Migdal, strong states in the "third world" are a
rarity. Newly developing states must first dislocate strong,
traditional societies to such an extent that previous methods of social
control (feudalism, paternal tribalism) have been destroyed. 4 Iraq's
regime from 1970 to the present dislocated its traditional society and
created strong state institutions, enabling the regime to survive a
crushing military defeat. Iraq's case is unusual though because the
state strength is only strong over that part of society which is Sunni
Muslim. Resistance from the Shia and Kurdish tribes could spread and
weaken the regime's coerced hold on the entire population. While it
displayed characteristics of a strong state, Iraq was able to amass the
"Migdal, op. cit., pp 269-277.
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technology sufficient to make nuclear weapons, despite apparent
international technological restraints.
How does a strong state support a nuclear development project? The
research effort is functionally diversified by component of the nuclear
fuel cycle. True, the various agencies compete with each other for
available state resources, but they are not prevented from sharing
information informally. The scientific leadership remains accountable
to the state, but it is not disrupted by new leadership appointments as
frequently. A strong state unifies the atomic effort at the largest
practical level. The nuclear project directors in strong states may
enjoy the luxury of making slow progress, without threat of unemployment
or worse, death. Government nuclear development agencies are also
unified to hasten the result, at no threat to the regime. Above all,
change in state leadership does not imperil the project. Significantly,
the state leader sustains the government investment consistently over an
extended mult i -year period.
A weak state controls its nuclear development project differently.
The state limits participation in the project to those with political
reliability. Therefore the project is structured primarily to minimize
political risk. The state reorganizes the agency under competing
government ministries to hinder the project. The state strictly
controls the scientific leadership. The regime removes scientific
leaders who are not politically reliable but does not allow them to
continue to function in the same capacity outside regime control. They
are placed in non- threatening "pasture" positions, as Rahman, Hedayat,
and El-Shazly were, or eliminated. The central agency will not share
research information with outside agencies including universities -
research which could assist the overall effort. Any subunit within the
science community which appears to operate independently of state
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control is divided into competing or functionally diversified agencies.
A weak state leadership diversifies the institution to defuse scientific
opposition to the regime.
Asia, Africa and Latin America have traditionally been the the focus
of American concerns in this subject. After the collapse of the former
Soviet Union, other European states are also a concern now. Table 13
applies the three conditions for nuclear proliferation - sufficient
motive, sufficient technology and state strength - to all past and
selected potential nuclear weapons states. This gives a comparison of
how the weak state model works to explain past cases, and a selection of
the range of potential future cases. This estimate of present states'
nuclear weapons motives, technical capabilities and state strength is a
broad generalization, to suggest the applicability of the weak state
model . Each individual suspected nuclear weapons state must be studies
in detail. Also, because state strength is not static, some present
weapon- states have become weaker since they first developed nuclear
weapons
.
Weak states which may be presently sufficiently motivated and
possess the minimum technology, include Brazil and Mexico. Some weak
states have not developed the technology yet, but may be close to
developing that necessary condition, such as Turkey.
What about the case of Pakistan? Pakistan was a weak state when it
developed nuclear weapons. However this outlier case demonstrates the
requirement of the weak state to isolate the scientific community from
domestic politics. President Ali Bhutto was able to successfully
isolate the Pakistani scientific community from domestic political
opposition for a sustained period (five years) after Pakistan had
developed a considerable scientific latent potential . This was a case
of a weak state leader risking his domestic security for the sake of
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international security priorities. It is interesting that Bhutto
survived only seven years in office compared to Nasir's eighteen and
Sadat's eleven. Both Nasir and Sadat were more conservative weak state
leaders than Bhutto, and they held power longer.












U.S. X X X
USSR X X X
Russia X X X
Ukraine X X X
Byelorussia X X
Kazakhstan X X X
UK X X X
France X X X
China X X X
India X X X
Ambiguous NWS :
Israel X X X
Pakistan X X X
South Africa X X





Czech Republic X X
Argentina X X
Taiwan X X X
South Korea X X X
Iraq X X X
Iran X X
Vietnam X
Brazil X X X
Egypt X X X
Cuba X X
Mexico X X
Saudi Arabia X X
Syria X X
Turkey X X
5This evaluation of state strength properly requires a detailed study of
each state's case. This would produce a rating of state strength on a continuum
from extremely weak to extremely strong,
sake
.
It is generalized here for argument's
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B. IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
American nonproliferation policy can only influence other state's
motives and capabilities. We cannot create strong or weak states. This
is a function of internal societal maturity and political conditions
leading up to the creation of states.
Nuclear export restrictions directed toward a weak state can slow
progress towards the necessary condition of technical capability, as it
may have done during the Sadat era in Egypt . International export
restraints may have three additional effects on the leader's nuclear
development dilemma of balancing domestic and international security
priorities. Nuclear supplier export restraints may encourage pro-
nuclear weapons scientists to support a counter- coup in order to bring
in a new pro-nuclear state leader. Alternately, outside pressure may
force the scientists to emigrate to other states where nuclear research
is supported by the state. A third possibility is that this foreign
pressure will result in the scientific community acceding to civilian-
use-only limits on technology imports. We can slow the weak state's
development of the necessary technology but there are other possible
outcomes which may do as much harm to our cause of restraining the
nuclear proliferation process as good. American nuclear
nonproliferation pressure must be crafted to widen the gulf between
domestic security priorities and international security priorities, to
dissuade a motivated weak state from acquiring the capability.
International nonproliferation pressure on strong states in the
developing world will be more successful in changing their motives than
in changing their technical capabilities. Strong states can develop the
technology once they have decided to develop modern industry. The
scientific community is not a threat to overthrow the regime in a strong
state. The obvious question is how much time is needed for strong
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states to develop the sufficient condition of technology given the
motive to acquire nuclear weapons? This varies with level of state
industrialization. India, Israel and South Africa are examples of
strong states which developed the technology over differing period of
time. Strong states' motivations can be changed by American diplomacy
evidenced by the nuclear guarantee to Taiwan and South Korea in 1975.
Foreign pressure on a strong state (such as Iran or North Korea
presently) will not succeed unless it is directed to change their motive
and dissuasive conditions for the weapons.
Foreign pressure can restrain motives, if only in the short run. It
cannot restrain technological development . American pressure on
Germany, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan has succeeded in temporarily
changing their motivational profile using conventional arms supplies,
alliances and the defensive nuclear guarantee. This political pressure
is a short-term solution to the problem of nuclear weapons spreading to
more states
.
U.S. policy can be effectively employed against both weak states and
strong states. Against weak states, outside pressure can slow
technology development. Against strong states, outside pressure can
modify the motive conditions for nuclear weapons, but not the technology-
condition. Nonproliferation policy must be executed with an
understanding of these effects and possible outcomes.
A weak state may muddle along for decades until a military
confrontation or massive domestic violence forges the society to look to
state structures for protection. Or the weak state may experience a
revolution which increases society' s participation in and ownership of
state structures. Until the weak state experiences this catharsis, the
domestic threat of a nuclear development program exceeds the
international security threat of a rival nuclear weapon state. Nuclear
ill
weapons development poses a dilemma which weak state leaders cannot
resolve - opposing domestic security and international security-
priorities .
The conditions which surround the Egyptian nuclear development
program from 1952 to 1981, during which time Egypt competed with Israel
to develop nuclear weapons and gave up the race, are instructive of the
domestic security threat of this highly-political advanced technology.
As long as Egypt continues to demonstrate a weak ability to extract
resources from and enact policies upon its population, notwithstanding
its basic scientific- industrial capacity to do so, Egypt will not
develop nuclear weapons. A state's international security motives and
technology development are necessary but not sufficient conditions for
nuclear proliferation. The necessary and sufficient condition is that
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